BRUCKNER (DO NOT DELETE)

1/28/2016 12:24 PM

Crowdsourcing (Bankruptcy) Fee Control
Matthew Adam Bruckner*
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 362
I. THE CHAPTER 11 FEE CONTROL SYSTEM .................................. 365
A. How Chapter 11’s Fee Control System Works ............ 367
B. An Overcharged Estate and Sub-Optimal Fee Review 374
i. Empirical
Evidence
Suggests
Professional
Overcharging May Be Pervasive .......................... 374
ii. Sub-Optimal Fee Review Is the Norm in Chapter
11 .......................................................................... 380
iii. Fee Controllers Cannot Effectively Control
Professional Overcharging Without Additional
Assistance.............................................................. 384
II. WHAT IS CROWDSOURCING? .................................................... 394
A. The Goldcorp Challenge ........................................... 395
B. Proctor and Gamble Crowdsources Research and
Development ............................................................ 398
C. Amazon Mechanical Turk and “Microtasking” ........ 400
III. CROWDSOURCING FEE CONTROL ........................................... 402
A. How Crowdsourcing Can Help Fix Chapter 11’s Fee
Control System ......................................................... 404
i. Information Gathering......................................... 404
ii. Information Processing ........................................ 407
iii. Innovation ............................................................ 410
B. What Might Crowdsourcing Look Like in Chapter

* Assistant Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. I would like to thank
Kara Bruce, Nancy Rapoport, Ray Warner, and workshop participants at the University
of Kentucky’s Developing Ideas Conference for their comments on a very early draft
of this Article. Additional comments, ideas, suggestions, and assistance were provided
by Laura Napoli Coordes, Pamela Foohey, Doron Kalir, Lynn LoPucki, Stephen
Lubben, Susan Saab Fortney, Greg Shill, and Michael Simkovic, as well as workshop
participants at the Mid-Atlantic People of Color Conference, anonymous reviewers on
behalf of the American Business Law Journal, and my wonderful colleagues at Howard
University School of Law. Research assistance was provided by Brittany Davis, Douglas
Howell, and Johnathan Nixon. Research support was provided by both Howard
University and Howard University School of Law. As always, this Article would not have
been possible without the support and feedback of my wife, Morgan Hall.

361

BRUCKNER (DO NOT DELETE)

362

1/28/2016 12:24 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:361

11? ............................................................................. 412
i. Who Is in the Crowd? ........................................... 413
ii. Incentivizing the Crowd ....................................... 415
iii. Quality Control Issues .......................................... 416
CONCLUSION................................................................................ 417

INTRODUCTION
Corporate bankruptcy cases1 are expensive.2 Perhaps even too
expensive.3 Empirical evidence suggests that cases may be so expensive
because some bankruptcy professionals overcharge their clients.4
Although chapter 11 has an elaborate fee control system designed to
prevent professional overcharging, the system is inadequate. Chapter
11’s fee control system appears to be failing for at least two reasons.
First, chapter 11’s fee control system suffers from information
deficits. Information deficits arise because creditors and other parties
to bankruptcy cases often fail to object to instances of potential
overcharging. Without objections to highlight potential instances of
professional overcharging, bankruptcy judges must often fail to reduce
1

The phrase “corporate bankruptcy cases” is used to refer to cases brought under
chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, notwithstanding that individuals
may also file chapter 11 cases. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
Bankruptcy Code or Code]. Individual chapter 11 cases are not the subject of this
Article.
2
After all, professional fees in the Lehman cases have already exceeded several
billion dollars. See James O’Toole, Five Years Later, Lehman Bankruptcy Fees Hit $2.2
Billion, CNN MONEY (Sept. 13, 2013, 6:24 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/13/
news/companies/lehman-bankruptcy-fees/.
3
See Stephen Lubben, The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: How Little We Know
(June 5, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2446663 [hereinafter Lubben, The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy]; see
also Troy A. McKenzie, Bankruptcy and the Future of Aggregate Litigation: The Past as
Prologue?, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 839, 845 (2013). Cf. Stephen Lubben, The Direct Costs of
Corporate Reorganization: An Empirical Examination of Professional Fees in Large Chapter 11
Cases, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 509, 512 (2000) [hereinafter Lubben, Direct Costs] (“Chapter
11 is substantially less expensive than other significant corporate transactions.”). But
cf. Stephen J. Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11—Part 2, 4 INT’L CORP. RESCUE
87, 91 (2007) [hereinafter Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11] (arguing that if
“the direct costs of chapter 11 are in line with other large corporate transactions[,]”
chapter 11 is not too expensive). The core idea of chapter 11 is that it may be possible
to reorganize a company, pay related expenses, and leave creditors better off than they
would have been if the company was not reorganized. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)
(2011) (legislative statements) (setting forth the “best interests” test, and requiring
that each creditor or interest holder receive as much under a chapter 11 plan as they
would have received in a chapter 7 liquidation).
4
See infra Part I.B.
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fees and expenses even when they should be reduced. By contrast, if
bankruptcy judges were alerted to possible problems, they could
investigate and reduce fees and expenses, as appropriate.5 Therefore,
improving chapter 11’s fee control system likely requires that
bankruptcy courts receive better information about instances of
potential overbilling, whether through objections or otherwise.
Second, chapter 11’s fee control system is challenging, tedious,
and, in many of the largest cases, potentially overwhelming. A single
mega-bankruptcy case can necessitate the review of thousands of pages
of time and expense entries over the life of that case.6 In order to
prevent professional overcharging, these entries must be carefully
reviewed to identify patterns, compared against relevant local rules or
fee application guidelines, and cross-checked across professionals. Fee
Controllers—those tasked with preventing professional overcharging
in bankruptcy cases—need additional assistance to do this job well.7 In
other words, chapter 11’s fee control system needs a greater ability to
scale up the number of fee reviewers and to ensure that the
information received by the fee control system is efficiently processed
and utilized.8
Crowdsourcing—broadly conceived as solving problems by
drawing on the contributions of many people—can help Fee
Controllers both to obtain better information and to better utilize the

5

In many cases, those with the best information about instances of potential
professional overcharging will be other professionals involved in a particular case.
Individual creditors, particularly those who frequently participate in corporate
bankruptcy cases, such as banks, may also be attuned to instances of potential
overcharging.
6
Lois R. Lupica & Nancy B. Rapoport, Best Practices for Working with Fee Examiners,
32 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 20–21 (June 2013). Of course, not every court requires a fee
application to be “the size of a boring victorian novel” but a conservative approach
explains the voluminous nature of many fee applications, particularly when the estate
also pays for those applications to be prepared. See In re Hotel Assocs., 15 B.R. 487,
488 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
7
This Article uses the term “Fee Controllers” to refer to the bankruptcy judge
and Assistant United States Trustee involved in a particular case. In certain instances,
other parties-in-interest and, where appointed, fee examiners may also be considered
Fee Controllers. Other parties to the case, however, infrequently participate in fee
control, and fee examiners are infrequently appointed, except in the largest cases. In
bankruptcy mega-cases, where fee examiners and committees are appointed more
routinely, even their assistance seems to be unable to turn the tide. See Lupica &
Rapoport, supra note 6, at 20.
8
Fee examiners, fee committees and auditors already serve this role in certain
cases. But, as discussed infra, crowdsourcing can be more effective and less expensive.
With appropriate incentives, creditors might also be willing to be more active
participants in bankruptcy cases, just as Congress appeared to imagine that they would
be.
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information they receive. First, crowdsourcing can help produce
better information, both about general market conditions and about
Crowdsourcing’s
specific instances of potential overcharging.9
usefulness as an information-gathering tool has been long
recognized.10 Market economies, which allocate goods and services by
using the wisdom of crowds to set prices, are an example of how
crowdsourcing can produce useful information.11 In every bankruptcy
case, there exists a coterie of bankruptcy professionals who have the
information and judgment necessary to help improve the fee control
system. A crowdsourced fee control system could tap into this
expertise. In addition, crowdsourcing could allow other parties, even
non-bankruptcy experts, to supply information about their relevant
experiences to improve chapter 11’s fee control system.12
A crowdsourced fee control system could also help improve the
usefulness of information received by enlisting the general public in
reviewing fee applications and related disclosures by professionals, as
well as any additional information produced by other members of the
9

See infra Part III.A.i.
See, e.g., AUDOBON.ORG, http://www.audubon.org/conservation/science/
christmas-bird-count (discussing how the Audobon Society crowdsources its annual
Western Hemisphere bird count); Top 5: Oldest Examples of Crowdsourcing, ARTICLE ONE
PARTNERS (Sept. 16, 2011), http://info.articleonepartners.com/top-5-oldestexamples-of-crowdsourcing/ (describing the crowdsourcing of “[a]ncient Babylonian
[h]ealth [c]are” as when “the family of the sick person would leave him or her out in
the middle of town. There, ‘passers-by come up to him, and if they have ever had his
disease themselves or have known any one who has suffered from it, they give him
advice.’”). See Ines Mergel et al., The Challenges of Challenge.Gov: Adopting Private Sector
Business Innovations in the Federal Government, 2014 47th HAW. INT’L CONF. ON SYS. SCI.
2073, 2076 (2014), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber
=6758860 (suggesting that crowdsourcing is best for solving problems related to
“research, information and information managing applications”).
11
See generally ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (London, W. Strahan and T.
Cadell 1776); cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Crowdsourcing Land Use, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 385
(2013).
12
One question that must be addressed when designing a crowdsourcing system
is who should be part of the crowd. Some studies suggest casting the widest possible
net, but others suggest a more limited crowd may be appropriate. See, e.g., Daren C.
Brabham, Crowdsourcing the Public Participation Process for Planning Projects, 8 PLAN.
THEORY 242, 245 (2009) [hereinafter Brabham, Crowdsourcing the Public Participation
Process] (noting that unrestrained public participation may not be an unmitigated
good); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1466 (2011) (noting that larger crowds produce more
information but that each piece of information is, on average, of lesser quality when
the crowds are larger). The distinction between studies seems to boil down to two
related inquiries: how many responses will be generated and will the volume of those
responses overwhelm the person(s) responsible for sorting through them. While
addressed to some degree in this Article, this issue will be explored in greater detail in
a planned follow-up article. See also infra note 280 and Part III.B.i.
10
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crowd. Crowdsourcing allows large and/or tedious projects to be
broken into small, discrete problems that can then be outsourced to
potential problem-solvers.13 Because bankruptcy fee applications
already report time in increments as small as six minutes, the task of
reviewing fee applications seems well-suited to being crowdsourced.14
In addition, crowdsourcing may be able to introduce greater
innovation into the fee control process. And finally, because a
crowdsourced system can supplement (and need not displace) the
existing fee control infrastructure, there is little downside risk to
crowdsourcing fee control.
It is time to apply crowdsourcing principles to solve chapter 11’s
fee control problems, and this Article suggests how crowdsourcing
might do so. In Part I, this Article explains the design of chapter 11’s
fee control system and describes the empirical evidence suggesting
that professional overcharging is a significant and widespread
problem. This part will also discuss why chapter 11’s fee control system
currently results in sub-optimal fee review and the essential elements
of an effective fee audit. Part II defines crowdsourcing, explains how
it works, and provides three examples that demonstrate
crowdsourcing’s advantages in solving chapter 11’s fee control
problem. Finally, Part III explains both how crowdsourcing can help
deter or prevent professional overcharging in chapter 11 cases and
provides some preliminary thoughts about the optimal design of a
crowdsourced fee control system.
I. THE CHAPTER 11 FEE CONTROL SYSTEM
Corporate bankruptcy cases have long been viewed as excessively
expensive.15 In recent years, one of the primary drivers of that
expense—professional representation—has substantially outpaced
13

See infra Part II.
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016(a) (requiring that professionals wishing to receive
compensation from the estate submit a formal fee application setting forth, among
other information, “a detailed statement of (1) the services rendered, time expended
and expenses incurred, and (2) the amounts requested”); see also James B. Hirsch,
Note, Bankruptcy Fee Applications: Compensable Service or Cost of Doing Business?, 58
FORDHAM L. REV. 1327, 1327 (1990) (These disclosures are essential because they allow
bankruptcy courts to make the necessary factual determinations “as to whether the
fees requested are reasonable.”).
15
See Lubben, The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy, supra note 3 (dating concerns
about bankruptcy costs to the first national bankruptcy laws); see also McKenzie, supra
note 3, at 845 (“Commentators—both scholarly and popular—remain critical of the
large fees garnered by lawyers in bankruptcy cases.”). Arguably, however, bankruptcy
cases are not excessively expensive. Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note
3.
14
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inflation.16 One reason for this rapid run-up may be that the
bankruptcy system lacks robust controls to ensure bankruptcy
professionals do not overcharge their clients.17 It appears that chapter
11’s fee control system fails to sufficiently deter or prevent bankruptcy
professionals from “padding” their bills by charging for work they
never performed, “milking” client files by doing unnecessary work or
otherwise aggressively billing for inefficient work, or treating their bills
as the opening bid in a negotiation over their fees rather than a record
of time reasonably spent.18
Even though the available empirical evidence suggests that
professional overcharging is a frequent and widespread problem,19
16

More than five times as fast as the rate of inflation according to one study. See
Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Professional Overcharging in Large Bankruptcy
Reorganization Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 983, 985 (2008) [hereinafter, LoPucki
& Doherty, Professional Overcharging] (reporting that professional fees and expenses in
large, public company bankruptcy cases increased by 71% over the six-year period of
the study compared to a 14% rise in consumer prices). See also Robert M. Lawless &
Stephen P. Ferris, Direct Costs in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 629 (2000)
(providing some empirical information on the cost of chapter 11’s direct costs,
including professional fees).
17
Some commentators have wondered if bankruptcy courts should be involved in
policing the fees paid to bankruptcy professionals at all. After all, if the person paying
the bill does not care, then why should anyone else? See Cynthia Baker, Other People’s
Money: The Problem of Professional Fees in Bankruptcy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 35, 41–69 (1996).
Others have suggested a role for the court is appropriate because there is “a significant
conflict of interest between client and attorney” once the work is done and the attorney
seeks money that would otherwise inure to the estate or to the creditors. See Third Cir.
Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 FED. RULES DECISIONS 237, 266 (1986).
18
See AM. BANKR. INST., CHAPTER 11 FEE STUDY: MOVING FORWARD ANALYSIS 931,
943–44 (2008) [hereinafter MOVING FORWARD] (material provided at ABI’s 13th
Annual Southeast Bankruptcy Workshop, July 16–19, 2008) (Professionals are not
supposed to be compensated “for either inefficiency or for spending time on projects
that are not beneficial to the estate.”); Carl T. Bogus, The Death of an Honorable
Profession, 71 IND. L.J. 911, 914 (1996) (indicting a “significant segment of the bar” for
“routinely and patently pad[ding] bills and defraud[ing] clients”); Susan Saab
Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data on the Problems and Pressure Points, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171, 190 (2005) (noting the incentive to “overwork” files created
by high billable hour requirements); Christine Parker & David Ruschena, The Pressures
of Billable Hours: Lessons from a Survey of Billing Practices Inside Law Firms, 9 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 619, 619 (2011) (reporting results from a survey of Australian lawyers that suggest
lawyers were more likely to engage “in unethical behavior when they believe that such
behavior is necessary” to meet certain performance standards, such as high billable
hour requirements).
19
See infra Part I.B.i.; see also Guidelines for Reviewing Applications for
Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Filed Under United States Code by
Attorneys in Larger Chapter 11 Cases, 78 Fed. Reg. 36248 (June 17, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ust/legacy/2013/06/28/Fee_Guidelines.
pdf [hereinafter Fee Guidelines] (The promulgation of new guidelines for reviewing
professional fee applications by the United States Trustees’ office is an apparent
acknowledgement of the problems that have long existed with the fee control
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professional overcharging need not and should not occur.20 The
following section explains how chapter 11’s fee control system works
and why it is currently unable to prevent professional overcharging.
A. How Chapter 11’s Fee Control System Works
In an effort to control the cost of professional representation in
bankruptcy cases, Congress created chapter 11’s fee control system.
This system imposes numerous obligations on bankruptcy
professionals. These obligations arise both prior and subsequent to
providing services. For example, in bankruptcy cases, the bankruptcy
court must review and approve each professional person’s or firm’s
employment and the estate may not pay a professional’s fees without
court approval.21 Section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code sets forth the
standard governing the employment of most22 professional persons
working for the debtor-in-possession23 or the trustee,24 and it provides
process.). But cf. Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 87
(suggesting that professional overcharging is not more prevalent inside of bankruptcy
than outside of bankruptcy).
20
Some have argued that professional overcharging will remain impossible to
prevent until all bankruptcy professionals adopt a value-based billing model. See, e.g.,
Steven J. Harper, Opinion, The Tyranny of the Billable Hour, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/opinion/the-case-against-the-law-firmbillable-hour.html?_r=0. While this may be true, there appears to be no bankruptcyspecific reason why bankruptcy professionals who bill by the hour outside of
bankruptcy should be forced to adopt an alternative billing method inside of
bankruptcy. Cf. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979). Instead, this Article takes
as a starting point that some bankruptcy professionals, particularly attorneys, bill by
the hour and offers a solution for sorting reasonable and necessary fees expenses from
unreasonable and unnecessary fees and expenses. See William G. Ross, The Ethics of
Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 19 (1991) (noting that “most private
practitioners seem relatively satisfied with time-based billing” and concluding,
therefore, that “changes in billing procedures are likely to occur only if corporate
counsel or clients demand them”).
21
11 U.S.C. § 330 (2011). See Nancy Rapoport, The Case for Value Billing in Chapter
11, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 117, 121 (2012) [hereinafter Rapoport, Value Billing]; see also
Kenneth A. Rosen & Barry Z. Bazian, Court’s Broad Power to Approve Appointment of Estate
Professionals, 34 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 44, 44 (Mar. 2015) (describing the requirement of
bankruptcy court approval as “unusual” because “in most other areas of law, a party
has total freedom to choose its professionals and court approval is not required”).
22
Section 327(a) governs the employment of professionals doing bankruptcyrelated work, but other sections govern the employment of professionals for other
purposes. 11 U.S.C. § 327(a). See Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 122; see also
§ 327(e).
23
And perhaps for official committees as well. See Rapoport, Value Billing, supra
note 21, at 123 n.34.
24
In many Bankruptcy Code sections, references to the trustee are generally
understood to also include the debtor-in-possession because the debtor-in-possession
enjoys most of the rights and duties of the trustee where the debtor-in-possession has
not been displaced by a trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2009); see also Rapoport, Value
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that:
[T]he trustee, with the court’s approval, may employ one or
more attorneys, accountants, appraisers, auctioneers, or
other professional persons, that do not hold or represent an
interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested
persons, to represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the
trustee’s duties under this title.25
Professionals must file retention applications in order to determine
whether they are “disinterested” and whether they “hold or represent”
interests adverse to the estate.26 While the vast majority of professionals
are retained by the debtor-in-possession, other parties-in-interest are
also entitled to have the bankruptcy estate pay for their professional
representation.27 For example, the estate pays the professional
representatives of any official committees.28 Bankruptcy judges have
broad discretion in determining whether to allow a professionals’
retention and, although most retention applications are uncontested,29
the judges may deny retention sua sponte.30
Once a professional’s employment is approved, that
professional’s fees may be paid by the debtor’s estate as an
administrative expense, pursuant to § 330.31 Section 330 provides that
professionals may earn “reasonable compensation for actual, necessary
services rendered.”32 This means that professionals may not charge an

Billing, supra note 21, at 121; Philip A. Schovanec, Bankruptcy: The Sale of Property Under
Section 363: The Validity of Sales Conducted Without Proper Notice, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 489,
490–91 (1993).
25
11 U.S.C. § 327(a).
26
§§ 327, 330.
27
§ 327(a); see Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Rise of the Financial Advisors:
An Empirical Study of the Division of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcies, 82 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 141, 142 (2008) (noting that approximately 80% of fees are paid to the debtors’
professionals, 19% of fees are paid to representatives of unsecured creditors, and only
approximately 1% to professionals advising all other parties).
28
Section 1103 is relevant to the employment of professionals working for official
committees. In relevant part, § 1103 provides that official committees “may select and
authorize the employment by such committee of one or more attorneys, accountants,
or other agents, to represent or perform services for such committee.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 1103 (2010).
29
MOVING FORWARD, supra note 18, at 934 (noting that “[o]bjections to proposed
retention of professionals in chapter 11 cases are fairly rare” with between 16.5–34%
objection rates, depending on case size).
30
See Rosen & Bazian, supra note 21.
31
Parties-in-interest are entitled to notice and the opportunity for a hearing
before a retention application may be approved. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 330(b), 503 (2011);
see also Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 124–25.
32
Under § 330, attorneys’ fees are reviewed for their reasonableness after the
representation has concluded. See § 330(a)(1)(A).
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unreasonable rate, and that professionals may only charge for services
that were necessary to perform.33 The Bankruptcy Code provides
additional guidance and prohibits compensation for “(i) unnecessary
duplication of services; or (ii) services that were not—(I) reasonably
likely to benefit the debtor’s estate; or (II) necessary to the
administration of the case.”34 To aid courts in making these
determinations, § 330 provides a list of factors for courts to consider
when reviewing the fees of bankruptcy professionals, including but not
limited to:
(A) the time spent on such services; (B) the rates
charged for such services; (C) whether the services were
necessary to the administration of, or beneficial at the
time at which the service was rendered toward the
completion of, a case under this title; (D) whether the
services were performed within a reasonable amount of
time commensurate with the complexity, importance,
and nature of the problem, issue, or task addressed; (E)
with respect to a professional person, whether the person
is board certified or otherwise has demonstrated skill
and experience in the bankruptcy field; and (F) whether
the compensation is reasonable based on the customary
compensation charged by comparably skilled
practitioners in cases other than cases under this title.35
33

A reasonable rate may still be a facially large hourly rate. For example, partners
at some of the most prominent bankruptcy law firms earn in excess of $1000 per hour.
See David Lat, Legal Fee Voyeurism: American Airlines’ Big-Time Bankruptcy Bills, ABOVE THE
LAW (Oct. 12, 2010, 2:03 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/10/legal-fee-voyeurismamerican-airliness-big-time-bankruptcy-bills/ (reporting that at least twelve Weil
Gotshal attorneys in the American Airlines bankruptcy case billed $1000 per hour or
more); see also Ashby Jones, On Billing Over $1,000 an Hour: ‘If You Can Get It, Get It,’
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2011, 9:27 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/02/23/onbilling-over-1000-an-hour-if-you-can-get-it-get-it/; Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell,
Who Knew Bankruptcy Paid So Well?, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/02/business/02workout.html?pagewanted=all
(“At several firms, including Weil and Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, partners
now charge $1,000 an hour or more for their bankruptcy services.”); Debra Cassens
Weiss, More Top Lawyers Break Through $1,000 Hourly Billing Barrier, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 23,
2011, 12:50 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/more_top_lawyers_break
_through_1000_hourly_billing_barrier/.
In addition, investment bankers are
commonly paid hundreds of thousands of dollars per month and can also qualify for
liberally defined “success fees” that exceed millions of dollars at the conclusion of a
case. See, e.g., Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 120 n.20 (discussing the
proposed retention application for debtors’ financial advisors in In re Energy Partners,
Ltd., No. 09-32957, 2009 WL 2970393, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2009)). Other
professionals may be similarly well-compensated.
34
See § 330(a)(4)(A).
35
See § 330(a)(3); see also In re Channel Master Holdings, Inc., 309 B.R. 855, 861
(Bankr. D. Del. 2004).
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To facilitate judicial review of the reasonableness and
appropriateness of their fees,36 professionals typically file so-called fee
applications. Fee applications should “contain sufficient information
about the case and the applicant so that the court, the creditors, and
the United States Trustee can review it without searching for relevant
information in other documents.”37 Fee Controllers should approve
all of the compensation requested in a fee application only if
professionals accurately and adequately describe the services they
rendered, and only request “reasonable compensation for actual,
necessary services rendered.”38 By contrast, if professionals seek
unreasonable compensation or compensation for services not actually
rendered or necessary for the estate, Fee Controllers should not
approve the requested compensation.39 In order to make these
determinations, chapter 11’s fee control system depends primarily on
Fee Controllers to review professional fee applications and thereby
catch and prevent any overcharging.
Apparently, Congress also expected that the estate’s creditors
would assist with the fee control process by reviewing the professional
fee applications and objecting to professional overcharging.40 That
expectation, however, appears unsatisfied, as creditors and other
parties-in-interest object to fee applications relatively infrequently.41 At
least three reasons may explain the limited participation in chapter
36

And to comply with guidelines promulgated by the office of the United States
Trustee and adopted in many bankruptcy courts. See Rapoport, Value Billing, supra
note 21, at 126; see also Fee Guidelines, supra note 19.
37
Regulations Relating to the Bankruptcy Reform Acts of 1978 and 1994, 28 C.F.R.
§ 58, app. A(a) (2010); see Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 126 (citing 28 C.F.R.
§ 58).
38
§ 330(a)(1)(A).
39
See, e.g., MOVING FORWARD, supra note 18, at 946 (noting that a professional’s
fees, if retained under 11 U.S.C. § 328, can only be reconsidered after they have been
incurred, if the “terms and conditions of the fee structure ‘prove to have been
improvident in light of developments not capable of being anticipated at the time of
the fixing of such terms and conditions.’”) (quoting § 328(a)).
40
See Charles J. Tabb, The Future of Chapter 11, 44 S.C. L. REV. 791, 798 (1993)
(“The problem of excessive professional fees” has captured Congressional attention.).
41
See LYNN M. LOPUCKI & JOSEPH W. DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES IN CORPORATE
BANKRUPTCIES: DATA, ANALYSIS, AND EVALUATION 170 (2011) [hereinafter LOPUCKI &
DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES] (reporting that approximately only 20% of fee
applications receive any objections, and the vast majority of those objections are filed
by the United States Trustee and involve small dollar sums); see also MOVING FORWARD,
supra note 18, at 934 (noting that, in a random sample, only 10% of fee applications
filed by debtor’s lead counsel received a formal objection). But see G. RAY WARNER &
KEITH J. SHAPIRO, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE NATIONAL REPORT ON PROFESSIONAL
COMPENSATION IN BANKRUPTCY CASES 57 (1991) (“[F]ee applications are being
subjected to substantial scrutiny.”).
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11’s fee control system. First, objections are expensive to prepare and
prosecute. Even worse, these costs are borne by the objecting party,
but successful objections do not necessarily inure to their benefit.42
Second, parties may be concerned that an objection will derail
unrelated negotiations.43 Third, some have alleged that a “conspiracy
of silence” exists among bankruptcy professionals.44 In short, this third
reason argues that the existence of repeat players in corporate
bankruptcy cases creates incentives that span individual cases,
encouraging parties-in-interest (and their professionals) not to object
to each other’s fees in any one particular case because of concerns
about future retribution.45
Without the participation of creditors, the burden of scrutinizing
and, where appropriate, objecting to fee applications tends to fall to
the Assistant United States Trustee assigned to a particular case.46
Objections by United States Trustees’ offices tend to involve violations
of narrow, technical rules rather than a substantive second-guessing of
the work done by bankruptcy professionals.47 Thus, courts are largely
left to review the work of bankruptcy professionals without the
assistance Congress expected would be rendered by creditors, and with
only limited assistance from United States Trustees’ offices.48 Without
42

Baker, supra note 17, at 57–58.
Corporate bankruptcy cases often involve extensive negotiations among
professionals. Unfortunately, “attacking a fee application can be a bit of an atom
bomb, when you want a low caliber pistol.” See id. at 58 (quoting Robert Levine,
Partner at Davis Polk & Wardwell (quoted in Barbara Franklin, Passing Fee Inspection:
Bankruptcy Bar Adjusts to Reduce Costs, N.Y. L.J., May 14, 1992, at 5)).
44
See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at xx-xxi; see also
Baker, supra note 17, at 58 (“[C]ourts often bemoan the lack of participation in the
fee process.”); McKenzie, supra note 3, at 882 (referring to a “‘ring’ of closely knit
lawyers who wielded excessive control at the expense of creditors” in a bankruptcy
case) (citing Susan Block-Lieb, What Congress Had to Say: Legislative History as a Rehearsal
of Congressional Responses to Stern v. Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55, 62–63 (2012)).
45
See McKenzie, supra note 3, at 882, 883–84 (discussing the perception of selfdealing by bankruptcy lawyers and suggesting that “the hint of corruption that
attached to the process” helped retard the prompt development of a more expansive
bankruptcy law); see also SOL STEIN, BANKRUPTCY: A FEAST FOR LAWYERS 60 (1999); Nancy
B. Rapoport, Rethinking Professional Fees in Chapter 11 Cases, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 263, 269
(2010) (noting the possibility of a “conspiracy of silence” among professionals who
regularly appear in chapter 11 cases to avoid challenging each other’s fees); Schwartz
& Creswell, supra note 33 (“Lawyers were reluctant to challenge their peers, fearing
retaliation.”).
46
See McKenzie, supra note 3, at 883 (referring to the United States Trustee as a
Congressionally-appointed “watchdog in bankruptcy cases”).
47
See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at 131; see also
MOVING FORWARD, supra note 18, at 934 (the United States Trustee objected in about
3% of all cases in one study and more than 13% in the largest cases).
48
Most bankruptcy judges will also have the assistance of one or more law clerks.
43
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a robust pool of insightful objections to focus their attention on
instances of potential professional overcharging, Fee Controllers are
unlikely to effectively review professional fee applications.49
Unsurprisingly, reductions in professional fee applications tend to
involve small dollar amounts, if any reductions are made at all.50
Even with objections to focus Fee Controllers’ attention, fee
review would often be an enormous task; without them, it may be an
impossible one.51 In a large corporate bankruptcy case, a bankruptcy
court typically receives fee applications from twelve to sixteen
professional firms every three months,52 and fee applications are
usually thirty or more pages.53 Assuming there are twelve professional
firms each filing a thirty-page application every three months for two
years, Fee Controllers must closely scrutinize 2880 pages of “singlespaced, small font lines of time entries and expense details” over the
course of the case.54 Add only four more professional firms, and Fee
49

At least three reasons have been put forward to explain why parties do not
participate in chapter 11’s fee control system. See supra text accompanying notes 42–
45.
50
See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, The Determinants of Professional Fees in
Large Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 135 (2004)
[hereinafter LoPucki & Doherty, Determinants].
51
Impossibility becomes a more serious proposition in bankruptcy mega-cases
even though fee examiners, committees, or auditors are appointed in many of these
cases. Even with this additional assistance, however, fee applications in mega-cases are
not reduced significantly. See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41,
at xx; cf. Lupica & Rapoport, supra note 6 (describing the differences between fee
examiners, committees and auditors). Although fee examiners might be expected to
have a deterrent effect, empirical evidence suggests that cases involving fee examiners
tend to have higher than expected fees. LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra
note 41, at xx.
52
See, e.g., Amended Guidelines for Fees and Disbursements for Professionals in the
Southern District of New York, U.S. BANKR. CT. S.D.N.Y. (June 17, 2013),
http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016-1-a-Guidelines.pdf; see also
Zolfo, Cooper & Co. v. Sunbeam-Oster Co., 50 F.3d 253, 255–56 (3d Cir. 1995)
(Seventeen legal, financial and accounting firms were each submitting monthly fee
applications for the court’s review and approval.); LoPucki & Doherty, Professional
Overcharging, supra note 16, at xx (reporting an average of twelve professionals per case
in large corporate reorganization cases with plans confirmed between 1998 and 2003,
with the twenty-six most recent cases averaging more than sixteen professionals per
case); Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21 (naming the professionals normally hired
in every large chapter 11 case); Procedures for Monthly Compensation and Reimbursement of
Expenses, U.S. BANKR. CT. S.D.N.Y. (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/2016-1-c-procedures.pdf.
53
See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 601 n.1 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker,
J., concurring) (noting the “massive set of fee applications, which, if stacked in one
pile, would amount to a pillar of paper 27 feet high”); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016(a);
In re Robinson, 368 B.R. 492, 498 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007).
54
Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 128; see also Clifford J. White III &
Walter W. Theus, Jr., Professional Fees Under the Bankruptcy Code: Where Have We Been, and

BRUCKNER (DO NOT DELETE)

1/28/2016 12:24 PM

2016] CROWDSOURCING (BANKRUPTCY) FEE CONTROL

373

Controllers will have to scrutinize 3840 pages (and hundreds of
thousands of lines of time and expense entries) instead. And in the
largest cases, there may be “tens of thousands of pages of fee
applications.”55
Fee control is challenging because Fee Controllers must analyze
these thousands of pages very closely. Mere skimming is not likely to
be sufficient. To uncover instances of overcharging, Fee Controllers
must review these fee applications to look for patterns, double-check
the fees and expenses against any relevant local rules or guidelines,
cross-check time entries across billers and across professionals, and
then follow up with professionals to discuss facially excessive or
unreasonable charges.56 Some of this work could likely be automated,
but Fee Controllers do not appear to have the tools at their disposal to
do so.57 In addition, some aspects of fee review may require a Fee
Controllers’ informed judgment in order to determine if the fees and
expenses that have been requested are appropriate.58
Fee control would be a challenging task for a small group of Fee
Controllers even assuming every bankruptcy professional was
scrupulous in their billing practices.59 But, as discussed in the next
section, evidence suggests that bankruptcy professionals do not always
exercise appropriate billing judgment.60 Instead, some bankruptcy
Where Are We Going?, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22, 22 (Jan. 2010).
55
White & Theus Jr., supra note 54.
56
Brief for the Neutral Fee Examiners in Support of Neither Party as Amicus
Curiae at 18, Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO, L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2158 (2015) (No. 14103),
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/baker-botts-l-l-p-v-asarco-l-l-c/
[hereinafter Brief for the Neutral Fee Examiners]; see also Lupica & Rapoport, supra
note 6 (discussing the various methods that fee examiners use for doing this work on
behalf of the court and the estate).
57
Some fee auditors do have specialized software to automate this work, but they
are not hired in every case. See Lupica & Rapoport, supra note 6.
58
But see Bernstein et al., infra note 264, at 314 (discussing how a Find-Fix-Verify
system can allow non-experts to produce expert-quality answers).
59
See, e.g., In re Jefsaba, Inc., 172 B.R. 786, 799 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (expecting
that “unproductive time will be written off”); In re Wildman, 72 B.R. 700, 707 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1987) (“[B]efore performing any service . . . [professionals must] first
scrupulously weigh and assess the necessity and propriety of each task for which he will
be seeking compensation.”); see also James P. Schratz, Billing Guidelines and Fee Disputes:
A Case Law Review, 18 TRIAL DIPLOMACY J. 159, 161 (1995),
http://jimschratz.com/Billing_Guidelines_article.pdf.
60
By “billing judgment,” bankruptcy courts seem to mean that they expect
professionals will “writ[e] off unproductive research time, duplicative services,
redundant costs precipitated by overstaffing, or other expenses with regard to which
the professional generally assumes the cost as overhead in corresponding nonbankruptcy matters, or for which analogous non-bankruptcy clients typically decline
to pay.” In re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 19 F.3d 833, 856 (3d Cir. 1994). See also In
re Jefsaba, Inc., 172 B.R. at 799; Hensley v. Eckerhort, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (stating
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professionals may occasionally bill the estate inappropriately.
Unfortunately, it may be that no one catches this overcharging.
B. An Overcharged Estate and Sub-Optimal Fee Review
i. Empirical Evidence Suggests Professional Overcharging
May Be Pervasive
Chapter 11’s fee control system is intended to do two things: (i)
prevent professional firms from being paid for more than the cost of
their reasonable and necessary services, and (ii) deter bankruptcy
professionals from performing services that are unlikely to benefit the
estate.61 To accomplish these goals, Fee Controllers should pay
particular attention to two issues. First, Fee Controllers must identify
services that were unreasonable or unnecessary to perform. Second,
Fee Controllers must identify when necessary services were performed
but have been billed at unreasonable rates.62 If the Fee Controllers can
prevent professionals from being compensated for these types of noncompensable services, bankruptcy professionals will be more likely to
self-regulate in future cases. Unfortunately, Fee Controllers generally
do not prevent either type of overcharging and therefore professionals
do not, by their own admissions, adequately self-regulate.
Empirical research suggests that bankruptcy professionals
routinely overcharge their clients.63 To be clear, fraud, abuse, or
malfeasance should not be assumed every time a professional’s fees or
expenses are disallowed.64 Fees and expenses may be disallowed
because of legitimate disagreements between professional firms and
Fee Controllers over appropriate staffing models,65 the appropriate
lawyers are expected to “make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours
that are excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary”); Schratz, supra note 59.
61
See MOVING FORWARD, supra note 18, at 945 (counsel are expected to note in
their fee applications what time has been written off “in order to demonstrate the
proper use of billing judgment”).
62
See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4) (2011).
63
See, e.g., Ross, supra note 20, at 15; see also Bogus, supra note 18; Fortney, supra
note 18; Parker & Ruschena, supra note 18; cf. LoPucki & Doherty, Determinants, supra
note 50 (focusing on the largest public company bankruptcy cases); LoPucki &
Doherty, Professional Overcharging, supra note 16 (same). But see Lubben, The
Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 90 (suggesting that staffing patterns at law
firms raise potential issues but because those issues appear similar inside and outside
of bankruptcy, this article claims that nothing is particularly wrong in bankruptcy).
64
Parker & Ruschena, supra note 18, at 621 (noting that “[e]ven in the absence
of fraud, clients run the risk of paying for inefficient lawyering, costs incurred in
training junior lawyers, turnover, and aggressive time recording”); see also Schwartz &
Creswell, supra note 33.
65
See Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 90.
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charges for reasonable and necessary work, or whether work was
reasonable or necessary to perform at all. But in surveys of nonbankruptcy attorneys,66 many lawyers readily admit to personally
overcharging their clients, with some admitting outright fraud and
others simply admitting to inefficiency.67 An even larger percentage of
those surveyed believe that their fellow attorneys overcharge their own
clients even more regularly.68 For example, one survey found that a
majority of lawyers believed that, occasionally or frequently, “lawyers
deliberately ‘pad’ their hours to bill clients for work that they do not
actually perform.”69 Almost two-thirds of this survey’s participants
(64.5%) admitted specific knowledge of lawyers padding their hours
by charging for work they did not perform.70 Of course, “padding”
often seems to be just a euphemism for fraud.
In addition to “padding” their bills, this same survey found that
law firm staffing models contributed to bills that would appear higher
than appropriate. In this survey, 29% of lawyers agreed that they or
other lawyers were regularly billing clients at attorney rates for work
that could have been done by secretaries or paralegals.71 Although this
is less egregious than charging for work that was never performed, it is
still unlikely to be compensable under § 330.72 Professor Stephen
66

There is no reason to suspect that a survey of bankruptcy attorneys would return
different results. The results may also be generalizable to all bankruptcy professionals.
Moreover, a lot of work done in bankruptcy cases is not bankruptcy-specific work. As
a result, it seems entirely appropriate to extrapolate from surveys of non-bankruptcy
lawyers.
67
Parker & Ruschena, supra note 18, at 642 (finding that 23% of survey
participants claimed to have actually observed instances of “padding” bills for work
never performed); see also Ross, supra note 20, at 15 (fraudulently inflating hours is
“especially common”); cf. Lisa Lerman, A Double Standard for Lawyer Dishonesty: Billing
Fraud Versus Misappropriation, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 847, 882 (1999) (calling it
“commonplace” when lawyers pad their hours).
68
Ross, supra note 20, at 16; see also Parker & Ruschena, supra note 18, at 642
(noting that 34% of attorneys surveyed reported concerns about the billing practices
of other members of their law firm).
69
Ross, supra note 20, at 93.
70
Id. at 16.
71
Id. at 94 app. A (The results under question 18 show that 29% of work currently
performed by lawyers could, to a “moderate” or “substantial” degree, be replaced by
work performed by secretaries or paralegals.). Ensuring the appropriate professional
does a particular task is also something that Fee Controllers must monitor. See, e.g., In
re Jefsaba, Inc., 172 B.R. 786, 796 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (stating that court should
investigate whether the “appropriate professional or paraprofessional is assigned to
the various tasks performed”); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 593 (3d
Cir. 1984) (finding that more than 5000 hours of partner time should have been
assigned to associates and refusing to approve the requested fees as a result). Cf.
Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 34.
72
Section 330(a)(3)(B) requires bankruptcy courts to consider “the rates charged
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Lubben’s empirical work also supports the contention that law firm
staffing models could be contributing to unnecessarily high legal
bills.73 In his work, Lubben notes that much of the expense in
bankruptcy cases is based on the billings of mid-level attorneys,
potentially suggesting that firms “lacked sufficient junior attorneys and
assigned the work to mid-level associates” instead.74
At a minimum, this evidence suggests that some law firms are not
overly concerned with limiting their costs and discounting their bills
when they fail to do so. But it may also support the more sweeping
indictment leveled by some commentators that “many attorneys who
bill by the hour have turned to engaging in deceptive billing
practices.”75 Particularly because it seems reasonable to suspect that
the surveyed professionals were under-reporting instances of
overcharging.76
Additional studies, case law, and anecdotal evidence support the
contention that legal professionals sometimes overcharge their
clients.77 For example, Professors LoPucki and Doherty claimed that
some professionals in mega-bankruptcy cases may not always exercise
appropriate billing judgment, and that professionals’ “billing
opportunity” could explain much of the apparent professional
overcharging they observed in their study.78 Their argument, which
aligns with the views of at least some judges, is that professionals should
voluntarily reduce their fees when, for example, the firm engages in
unnecessary research.79 This does not appear to be happening,
for such services” when determining whether to approve professional compensation
requests. This seems to require that firms use the least expensive service provider. 11
U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(B) (2011).
73
Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 90.
74
Id.
75
Hourly Billing for Lawyers’ Time: The Legal Profession’s “Not So Hidden Shame”?,
LEGAL BILL AUDIT BLOG (June 27, 2014), http://legalbillaudit.com/hourly-billinglawyers-time-legal-professions-hidden-shame/; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA COMMISSION
ON BILLABLE HOURS REPORT 2001–2002 1, 43 (2002), http://ilta.personifycloud.com/
webfiles/productfiles/914311/FMPG4_ABABillableHours2002.pdf (The hourly
billing model encourages questionable billing practices, including billing for
unnecessary research or even outright padding. “These are not imaginary fears.”).
76
See Bogus, supra note 18, at 927 n.148 (exploring various reasons—all related to
Ross’s survey methodology—why his results likely under-reported instances of
padding).
77
See Ross, supra note 20, at 15 (anecdotal examples of fraud or otherwise inflated
bills).
78
See LoPucki & Doherty, Professional Overcharging, supra note 16. Cf. Lubben,
Direct Costs, supra note 3 (finding that big cases cost more, but acknowledging that size
could be a proxy for case complexity).
79
See, e.g., In re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 19 F.3d 833, 855–56 (3d Cir. 1994);
see also In re Jefsaba, Inc., 172 B.R. 786, 799 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (court expects that
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particularly in the largest cases. Instead, professional firms appear to
In their view,
overbill the estate for unnecessary services.80
overcharging may be more pronounced in the largest bankruptcy cases
because there are more opportunities to perform unnecessary work.81
In other words, professionals may charge more in large cases simply
because there are more opportunities to do work related to a case, even
though that additional work is not necessary to perform.82 Professor
LoPucki, however, has noted that the existence of billing opportunities
does not necessarily suggest that firms are acting opportunistically, but
it does create the possibility for opportunism.83
A few notable decisions also exist in which judges have trimmed
excessive professional fees while colorfully describing the deplorable
behavior of particular bankruptcy professionals.84 For example, one
“unproductive time will be written off”).
80
See LoPucki & Doherty, Professional Overcharging, supra note 16, at 1012; see also
Lisa G. Lerman, Blue-Chip Bilking: Regulation of Billing and Expense Fraud by Lawyers, 12
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 205, 231 (1999) (suggesting that when lawyers are servicing large
clients and expect to deliver them large bills, making “small modifications in time
sheets or expense vouchers [can] seem insignificant or permissible”).
81
Compare LoPucki & Doherty, Professional Overcharging, supra note 16, at 1012
(noting evidence of billing opportunities for professional firms in the largest corporate
bankruptcy cases), with Hirsch, supra note 14, at 1334 n.39 (citing cases cutting
professional fees for duplicating work, performing unreasonable work, or for billing
time that was “ill spent”).
82
See Lerman, supra note 80, at 231, 245 (suggesting that a lot of overcharging is
not simply a failure of judgment but reflects “shameless, pre-meditated chronic
thievery”); see generally Ross, supra note 20 (discussing survey results about the “rich
opportunities for unscrupulous attorneys to overcharge clients, since the amount of
time that needs to be spent on [various tasks] is highly subjective”). But see Lupica &
Rapoport, supra note 6 (suggesting that the authors operate on the presumption that
professionals do not intend to overcharge the estate); Claire Hamner Matturro,
Auditing Attorneys’ Bills: Legal and Ethical Pitfalls of a Growing Trend, 78 FLA. BAR J., May
1999, at 14 (claiming that “[c]ommentators have noted that the majority of attorneys
are ethical in their billing practices”).
83
Private correspondence with Lynn M. LoPucki, Professor of Law, UCLA Law
School (on file with Author).
84
See, e.g., Lederman Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Trustee, 997 F.2d 1321, 1323–24 (10th
Cir. 1993); see also Keate v. Miller, 95 F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 1996) (denying attorney’s
fees for work that counsel should have realized could not benefit the estate); In re Fine
Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 572–73 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that the bankruptcy
court reduced fee applications by approximately 80% because it found that the fee
petitions were “grossly excessive on their face” and that attorneys “wasted hours on
useless tasks,” duplicated efforts, and masked “outright padding”); In re Bank of New
England Corp., 142 B.R. 584, 585–86 (D. Mass. 1992) (reducing fees by 42% despite
noting problems with less than 2% of the relevant time entries because “courts should
not spend . . . nonexistent Court resources to track down every entry, correlate them
against other fee applications, and . . . delete those entries insufficiently
substantiated”) (second alternation in original); Real v. The Continental Grp., Inc.
653 F. Supp. 736, 741 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (court reduced fees by 40% because of, among
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court refused to approve certain professional fee requests because
those professionals treated the debtor like a “cash cow to be milked to
death.”85 Other courts have labeled professionals as “hogs” that ought
to be slaughtered.86 While these cases suggest that chapter 11’s fee
control system does work occasionally, courts may fail to catch many
instances of professional overcharging.87 But even in those cases where
some meaningful review does occur and fees are trimmed, fees are
rarely trimmed significantly. In LoPucki and Doherty’s sample, they
found that the median fee cut was less than 4%, which seems too small,
given the survey results about professional overcharging.
The evidence seems indisputable that some professionals engage
in outright fraud; others do not defraud their clients, but nor do they
exercise the degree of billing judgment, including writing off
unproductive time that the Code, commentators, and courts expect.88
One instance where lawyers seem particularly likely to overcharge their
clients is when they are repurposing work done for a former client for
use by a new client.89 For example, assume that two secured creditors
retain a law firm on an hourly basis in a chapter 11 case, and that both
clients want to file objections to the debtor’s plan of reorganization.
Client A retains the law firm first and pays $10,000 for the work, based
other things, “inflated billing”); In re Patronek, 121 B.R. 728, 734 (Bankr. E.D. Penn.
1990) (reviewing and disallowing fees because the bill was “clearly inflated” and the
work was likely “concluded in a matter of seconds”).
85
In re Chas A. Stevens & Co., 105 B.R. 866, 871–72 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); see also
In re Energy Partners, Ltd., 409 B.R. 211, 237 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009).
86
In re Energy Partners, Ltd., 409 B.R. at 237. “The underlying principle is, if you
can get it, get it.” Jones, supra note 33 (quoting famed bankruptcy lawyer Harvey Miller
on billing rates). See also McKenzie, supra note 3, at 858–59 (discussing criticism of fee
awards in bankruptcy cases).
87
See Ross, supra note 20, at 28 (“Attorneys currently engage in a number of
practices which waste time and therefore unnecessarily inflate client bills.”); Schratz,
supra note 59, at 159 (“[There] can be little doubt that deceptive attorney billing is a
significant problem.”). Professor (and sometimes fee examiner) Nancy Rapoport has
suggested that bankruptcy firms will sometimes “send eight people to a hearing
because there is an outside chance they might have to speak at that hearing” and if a
firm did this for a non-bankruptcy client, that client would “go ballistic.” Schwartz &
Creswell, supra note 33.
88
See id. See also Susan Saab Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate
Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L.
REV. 239, 253 (2000) (noting an absence of written guidelines within law firms on
billing practices, and suggesting this absence can “lead to questionable billing
practices by some associates”).
89
Parker & Ruschena, supra note 18, at 626 (discussing the practice of recycling
previously completed work for new clients and the impulse to bill the second client in
excess of the hours expended to complete that work); see also Fortney, supra note 88,
at 257 (discussing ABA Formal Ethics Op. 93-379 and its condemnation of recycling
work).
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on the firm’s hourly rates multiplied by the number of hours
expended.90 If the law firm then “recycles” the work it did for Client A
when preparing Client B’s objection, it now faces a choice. Should it
charge Client B $10,000 or should it charge Client B only for those
hours reasonably expended in modifying Client A’s objection to suit
Client B’s needs? Although it is widely agreed that the former option
is likely both unethical and fraudulent,91 approximately one quarter of
surveyed lawyers suggested that it is either ethical to charge Client B a
premium or that they would do so notwithstanding the ethical issues
presented.92 If recycling Client A’s work product for Client B resulted
in time savings, that time savings must be passed along to Client B
under an hourly fee arrangement. Fee Controllers are charged with
ensuring this happens.
To sum up, empirical evidence suggests that some professionals
charge clients for work never performed (i.e., “padding” their bills) or
unnecessary work performed (i.e., “milking” client files), or charge
higher-than-appropriate rates because they are not using the lowestcost provider for that work.93 The next section will explore why chapter
11’s fee system cannot be expected to deter or prevent more of this
professional overcharging without being overhauled.

90

This is known as the “lodestar” method of computing appropriate professional
fee requests. See, e.g., Blum v. Stensen, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984); Stalnaker v. DLC Ltd.,
376 F.3d 819, 825 (8th Cir. 2004) (“The lodestar method, calculated as the number of
hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, is the appropriate
calculation of fees [under 11 U.S.C. § 330].”).
91
And certainly a violation of 11 U.S.C. § 330 (2011). The ABA also condemns
the practice. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-379
(1993), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/genpractice/
resources/costrecovery/ABA_CommEthics_Opinion.authcheckdam.pdf; see also
Fortney, supra note 88, at 257.
92
Parker & Ruschena, supra note 18, at 648–50; Ross, supra note 20, at 58. See also
Fortney, supra note 88, at 258–59 (noting the percentage of survey respondents who
admitted to double-billing for recycled work varies with firm size).
93
Not only did 20–25% of surveyed lawyers freely admit to “padding” their bills,
but approximately two–thirds suggested that attorneys regularly charge for work
completed by persons more senior (and thus more expensive) than was required by
the task. In addition an overwhelming majority (64.5%) claimed to “know some” or
“know many” lawyers who “‘pad’ their hours to bill clients for work that they do not
actually perform.” See Ross, supra note 20, at 15. See also MOVING FORWARD, supra note
18, at 943 (noting that whether a matter is one that should be performed by attorneys
or by paraprofessionals remains subject to “a great deal of discussion”); Parker &
Ruschena, supra note 18, at 650.
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ii. Sub-Optimal Fee Review Is the Norm in Chapter 11
The potential for professional overcharging arises because
chapter 11’s fee control system is not as effective as it ought to be, nor
as effective as it could be. An effective fee control system should be
able to regularly identify inappropriate professional bills and, where
appropriate, reduce the fees and expenses of estate-paid
professionals.94 Yet, chapter 11’s fee control system appears to neither
For
sufficiently control nor deter professional overcharging.95
example, one study found that approximately 96% of fees requested
were approved in forty-three of the forty-eight mega-bankruptcy cases
examined.96 This same study found that the median reduction in fees
in Delaware—where many of the largest bankruptcy cases are filed—
was less than one percent.97 To the extent that professional
overcharging is a widespread problem, the lack of fee reductions
suggests the flawed nature of chapter 11’s fee control system.98 This
may help explain why the cost of professional representation in the
largest corporate bankruptcy cases has grown at more than five times
94

Some scholars have argued that the opposite may be true and that bankruptcy
professionals have a greater ability to bill opportunistically and may therefore engage
in more, rather than less, inappropriate billing. See LoPucki & Doherty, Professional
Overcharging, supra note 16. In large law firms, attorneys are generally expected to bill
their clients for more than 2000 hours a year and, in the face of such expectations,
“there are bound to be temptations to exaggerate the hours actually put in.” William
H. Rehnquist, C.J., Dedicatory Address: The Legal Profession¸62 IND. L.J. 151, 155 (1987);
see also Bogus, supra note 18, at 925 (describing lawyers reported annual billings as
“quite literally, incredible”). See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 75; Fortney, supra
note 18; Parker & Ruschena, supra note 18; Milton C. Regan, Corporate Norms and
Contemporary Law Firm Practice, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 931 (2002).
95
LoPucki & Doherty, Professional Overcharging, supra note 16 (suggesting that
chapter 11’s fee control system does not successfully control the cost of professional
services).
96
It is possible that a less-than 4% reduction (or 1% in Delaware) adequately
captures all of the unreasonable or excessive bills that the survey data alludes to. See
LoPucki & Doherty, Determinants, supra note 50, at 114, 135. This hypothesis, however,
seems unlikely. Rather, it seems more likely that our current fee control system is
failing to identify instances of professional overcharging and therefore failing to
adequately control it by cutting fee requests. See supra text accompanying notes 66–
75.
97
See LoPucki & Doherty, Determinants, supra note 50, at 114, 135.
98
The promulgation of new fee review guidelines by the U.S. Trustees’ office
supports the view that the fee control system has been broken. See generally Fee
Guidelines, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/ust/fee-guidelines (last
visited Nov. 29, 2015); see also Schwartz & Creswell, supra note 33 (“‘There’s clearly
pressure on people to create more revenue,’ says Robert White, a former bankruptcy
partner at O’Melveny & Myers who retired in 2006 after practicing for 35 years.”);
Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 128; White & Theus Jr., supra note 54. But see
Hirsch, supra note 14, at 1334 (claiming that “bankruptcy courts routinely slash
requested fees”).
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the rate of inflation in recent years.99
To fix chapter 11’s fee control system, one must understand why
Fee Controllers do not adequately control professional overcharging.
Outside of bankruptcy, clients are expected to take the laboring oar in
controlling the cost of their professional assistants and ensuring the
appropriateness of any fees charged. For example, before hiring a law
firm, the client may host a so-called “beauty contest” where it can try to
ensure that it is hiring a professional firm with the right expertise to
address its needs and negotiate billing rates.100 After a bill for
professional services arrives, clients outside of bankruptcy will often
scrutinize that bill carefully, sometimes with the help of a fee auditor,
and may question potentially inappropriate or especially large
entries.101 Outside of bankruptcy, if the client does not control these
costs, no court or other third party is likely to interfere with its decision
to overpay for professional services.102
In bankruptcy cases, clients evidence less concern with
professional fees than their non-bankruptcy counterparts.103 They
appear less careful in their initial hiring decisions, and less aggressive
when negotiating for discounts or scrutinizing the bills of their
professionals and pushing back against large or questionable charges.
A variety of reasons for these differences have been advanced,104
99

LoPucki & Doherty, Professional Overcharging, supra note 16. Of course, some
portion of this increase may relate to an increase in legitimate work. Cases are—
undoubtedly—larger and more complex than ever before.
100
“The law firm beauty contest is an orchestrated interviewing process. The
company is the buyer. The law firm is the seller. The process allows each to take the
measure of the other before becoming engaged.” Wendeen H. Eolis, Beauty Pageants,
EOLIS, http://eolis.com/content/beauty-pageants (last visited Nov. 22, 2015); see also
Lerman, supra note 80, at 222 (“Corporate clients that once each had a deep and stable
relationship with a single firm now solicit bids from law firms for various chunks of
legal work.”).
101
See, e.g., Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 130–31.
102
See Baker, supra note 17 (suggesting that if the person paying the bill doesn’t
care, no one else should either); see also Schratz, supra note 59, at 164 (citing In re
Associated Grocers of Colorado, Inc., 137 B.R. 413 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990)); cf. Third
Cir. Task Force, supra note 17 (stating that the court has a role in fee control because
there is “a significant conflict of interest between client and attorney” once the work
is done and the attorney seeks money that would otherwise inure to the estate or to
the creditors).
103
But see Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3 (suggesting that
the cost of bankruptcy transactions compared well to the cost of comparable nonbankruptcy transactions).
104
See In re Ginji Corp., 117 B.R. 983, 988 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1990); see also In re
Saturley, 131 B.R. 509, 516 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991) (suggesting that excessive fees result
from “foreknowledge that the assets so expended will be surrendered in any event, by
the debtor’s unwillingness to ‘strain his relationship with his life-rope, his attorney,’
and by the timidity of other counsel who, although adverse, may expect payment from

BRUCKNER (DO NOT DELETE)

382

1/28/2016 12:24 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:361

including agency issues—clients tend to spend someone else’s
money105—and the client’s fear of alienating its professional advisors.106
There are also time pressures inherent in many bankruptcy cases that
are not present outside of bankruptcy.107 Another reason, not often
discussed, is that even generally sophisticated clients may not be
sophisticated consumers of professional corporate bankruptcy
services.108 This may be a particular problem with debtors, who
represent the single largest consumer of professional representation
in chapter 11 cases.109 Although some companies file for bankruptcy
under chapters 22 or 33, most companies will never spend time in
bankruptcy, and those that do will usually make only one trip through
the system.110 Without a substantial prospect of repeat business,
professionals may lack a sufficient incentive for professionals to write
off unproductive time. Whatever the reason(s), bankruptcy clients
appear unwilling to meaningfully contribute to the success of chapter
11’s fee control system relative to their non-bankruptcy peers.111
the estate, as well”) (citation omitted); Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 131.
105
See Baker, supra note 17; see also LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra
note 41, at xv (suggesting that corporate bankruptcy cases tend to cost far more than
expected).
106
Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 131.
107
See Matthew A. Bruckner, Improving Bankruptcy Sales by Raising the Bar: Imposing
a Preliminary Injunction Standard for Objections to Section 363 Sales, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 1
(2012) (discussing the frequent assertion by debtors that bankruptcy sales must be
hastily approved or their assets will melt away like an ice cube); Melissa B. Jacoby &
Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy,
123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014) (same); see also STEIN, supra note 45, at 45 (noting that many
CEOs are in a hurry to hire bankruptcy professionals and have neither the time nor
the capacity to determine whether potential hires are a good match).
108
See STEIN, supra note 45, at 44 (comparing the CEO of a troubled company to a
newborn baby when it comes to bankruptcy matters).
109
See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 27 (finding that approximately 80% of
professional fees are incurred “for representation of, or advice to, the debtor-inpossession”); see also Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at 139–40.
110
Chapter 22 is the colloquial phrase sometimes used when a company files for
chapter 11 bankruptcy for the second time. See What is Chapter 22 Bankruptcy? Do Any
Prominent Examples Come to Mind?, BERNSTEIN-BUCKLEY, P.C., http://
bernsteinlaw.com/faq-list/chapter-22-bankruptcy-creditors-rights-questions-andanswers/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2015). Similarly, Chapter 33 is the phrase for the far
less common occurrence of a company taking a third trip into chapter 11 bankruptcy.
See Scott Fearon, Dex Media: A Rare ‘Chapter 33’ Bankruptcy in the Making, SEEKING ALPHA
(Sept. 26, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://seekingalpha.com/article/1714422-dex-media-arare-chapter-33-bankruptcy-in-the-making.
111
Clients who feel ill-equipped to decide which professionals will do the best job
for their company may feel compelled to hire the most expensive professional
representatives that they can because they may view price as a proxy for competence.
See, e.g., STEIN, supra note 45, at 48 (The author, a former CEO, complains in this book
that the only bankruptcy counsel his company could afford was “a half-price lawyer.”).
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Given the numerous potential problems with a client-centered fee
control system in bankruptcy, Congress unsurprisingly imposed an
external check on fees awarded to bankruptcy professionals in chapter
11 cases.112 Congress’ external check required that Fee Controllers
review both retention and fee applications.113 But its solution has not
proved to be effective, and fee control obligations seem to overwhelm
even the most diligent Fee Controllers.114 It could hardly be otherwise,
considering that in a single mega-bankruptcy case Fee Controllers are
expected to review a “massive” volume of fee applications, which “if
stacked in one pile, would amount to a pillar of paper 27 feet high.”115
But professionals will almost surely be overpaid if Fee Controllers
decide not to put on their green eyeshades and audit every fee
application because Fee Controllers are the last line of defense in
chapter 11’s fee control process.116
Nevertheless, professional
overcharging may remain inevitable under the system’s current design
because it is not clear that Fee Controllers have the necessary resources
to deter or prevent most professional overcharging even if they make
a good faith effort.117 Therefore, it is appropriate to consider how to
redesign the fee control system.

112

See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at 132; see also Hirsch,
supra note 14, at 1327 n.4 (stating that bankruptcy courts have “an affirmative duty to
make an independent evaluation of reasonableness of all professional fees”) (citing In
re Bilgutay, 108 B.R. 333, 336 n.2 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989)).
113
Judges are charged with second guessing the debtors-in-possession because
debtors-in-possession are not “real fiduciaries.” LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL
FEES, supra note 41, at 132 (judges have been seen as necessary to prevent abuse
because there “may be little incentive for parties in interest, and especially for the
debtor, to monitor and object to excessive fee requests”); see also Baker, supra note 17,
at 59 (“Because of the lack of stakeholder participation, the system has adopted
administrative controls—independent review by bankruptcy courts or review by the
U.S. Trustee—to fill the gap.”); Hirsch, supra note 14, at 1330 n.17 (“[T]he Code’s
compensation scheme clearly envisions a large degree of court involvement in the
employment and compensation of bankruptcy professionals . . .”).
114
But see Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3 (arguing that if
“the direct costs of chapter 11 are in line with other large corporate transactions . . .
general improvements in the market for professional services, rather than any
bankruptcy-specific innovation” is the appropriate way to reduce chapter 11 costs).
115
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 601 n.1 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker,
J., concurring).
116
Green Eyeshade, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_eyeshade (last
visited Nov. 22, 2015).
117
Evidence suggests that they have not been terribly effective so far. See LoPucki
& Doherty, Determinants, supra note 50, at 114, 135 (finding that the average fee cut
was less than 4% in forty-three of the forty-eight cases in authors’ database).
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iii. Fee Controllers Cannot Effectively Control Professional
Overcharging Without Additional Assistance
Having Fee Controllers act as surrogates for the estate supposedly
ensures that bankruptcy professionals do not overcharge their clients
and deprive the estate of assets. Although Fee Controllers are
generally more willing than clients to control professional
overcharging in chapter 11 cases, they too are generally ineffective.118
Excluding potential deterrent effects, which LoPucki and Doherty’s
work suggests are illusory (at least in the largest cases), chapter 11’s fee
control system reduces fees by very little, and costs more to operate
than it saves.119 Some bankruptcy scholars have proposed scrapping
chapter 11’s entire fee control system and redesigning it from the
bottom up.120
With appropriate crowdsourcing enhancements,
however, that ought to be unnecessary.
1. Effective Fee Reviews Require Three Things Fee Controllers
Struggle With
Evidence suggests that professional fees are too high, in part,
because the statutorily mandated fee reviews in chapter 11 cases are
ineffective.121 An effective fee review requires that Fee Controllers do
at least three things well. First, they must know every estate-paid
professional.122 Second, Fee Controllers must be familiar with all of the
work produced in a case and paid for by the estate.123 Finally, Fee
118

See supra notes 94–98.
See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at 165 (claiming that
our current fee control system costs approximately four times as much as it saves); see
also WARNER & SHAPIRO, supra note 41, at 1 (“Few areas of bankruptcy practice are more
publicly controversial or less consistently administered than the determination of
reasonable compensation for the trustees and professionals who are essential to an
efficient and well-managed bankruptcy process.”).
120
See, e.g., LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at 165. But see
Hon. Roger M. Whelan et al., Professional Compensation Reform: New Ideas or Old Failings?,
1 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 407, 407 (1993) (“[J]ust as one does not cut down the tree
because a few apples have worms, the entire bankruptcy compensation scheme devised
by Congress does not need to be scrapped to cure the excesses of what is only a
minority of cavalier and greedy players in a few well-heralded cases.”).
121
See supra notes 94–98.
122
Although how well Fee Controllers must know the professionals in order to
make the appropriate determinations is not clear, it seems that the bar is set fairly high
by § 330. It seems that Fee Controllers must know the professionals either through
personal interactions or by otherwise acquiring sufficient information about these
professionals to make the appropriate determinations.
123
As matters currently stand, it is not economical for Fee Controllers to review
every piece of written work produced in a case. In the interests of cost efficiency and
the need for triage, some Fee Controllers are presumably left only reviewing the largest
charges. See Lupica & Rapoport, supra note 6 (noting the likely tendency of fee
119
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Controllers must compare the work produced to the charges incurred
for its production. But, as described immediately below, Fee
Controllers struggle with each task and would benefit from
crowdsourcing some aspects of the process. As a result, they do not
perform effective fee reviews, and professional overcharging goes
largely unchecked.
a. Know the Professionals
The first requirement for an effective fee review is to know the
estate-paid professionals well enough to make the § 330
determinations.124 Section 330 appears to require that Fee Controllers
be intimately familiar with the professionals in the particular case at
bar and with “comparably skilled practitioners.” But there are often
dozens (and there can be hundreds or even thousands) of estate-paid
professionals involved in any given case.125 Thus, Fee Controllers may
not possess sufficient familiarity with many bankruptcy professionals,
particularly the newer ones, to make these determinations.126 This is
true despite the presence of some repeat players.127 Fee Controllers
need to obtain better information from outside sources, and could
probably also use help reviewing the information received—
particularly in the largest cases.
Section 330 requires that Fee Controllers know the estate-paid
professionals well enough to make a series of informed decisions about
their competence, skill, and experience, but it provides few tools for
obtaining this information. Existing information-acquisition methods
appear limited to two options: (i) Fee Controllers’ first-hand
knowledge of that professional and (ii) disclosure obligations imposed
on the professionals. Both of these methods seem insufficient for
examiners to review only big ticket work items).
124
See supra text accompanying note 35.
125
See Brief for the Neutral Fee Examiners, supra note 56 (noting that
approximately 5300 timekeepers sought compensation in the Lehman Brothers’ cases
and 2200 timekeepers sought compensation in the American Airlines’ cases).
126
In many firms, mid-level professionals take the laboring oar on many tasks in a
bankruptcy case. See Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 89–90.
These mid-level professionals are unlikely to have encountered Fee Controllers often
enough for Fee Controllers to have a personal impression of them. Although Fee
Controllers can request additional information about these professionals, it is unclear
that is sufficient. Cf. Third Cir. Task Force, supra note 17, at 262 (Judges may find that
it is “difficult, indeed, in most instances, impossible, to police these matters by looking
over the shoulders of lawyers to monitor the way they handle their cases. To impose
that obligation on the Bench is unrealistic, unduly time-consuming and typically will
amount to little more than an exercise in hindsight.”).
127
See Lubben, Direct Costs, supra note 3, at 531 (contesting the claim that there are
as many repeat players as is commonly thought).
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obtaining the type of information necessary to prevent professional
overcharging, particularly in large bankruptcy cases where thousands
of professionals will seek compensation from the estate.
Whether a bankruptcy case involves a dozen estate-paid
professionals or thousands, the very structure of chapter 11 cases
makes it difficult for Fee Controllers to personally know each
professional well enough to make the requisite § 330 determinations.
It is the nature of chapter 11 cases that negotiations often occur
between different parties-in-interest concurrently and that some estatepaid professionals are actively engaged while others are much more
passive. Fee Controllers do not know the estate-paid professionals
personally because many firms send only a small cadre of professionals
to court, which is where most Fee Controllers would interact with and
get to know the relevant professionals.128 Instead, most firms’
professionals will labor totally in the background (at least to the eyes
of Fee Controllers). As a result, Fee Controllers lack sufficient
personal familiarity with some (potentially large) portion of the estatepaid professionals, making an effective fee review difficult if the
professionals’ disclosures are not sufficient.129
Fee Controllers are expected not only to know the bankruptcy
professionals in the case at bar, but also to obtain information about
“comparably skilled practitioners.”130 Given that Fee Controllers lack
sufficient personal contact with the bankruptcy professionals who
appear in bankruptcy matters, it is surely true that Fee Controllers will
have even less information about comparably skilled non-bankruptcy
professionals. Obviously, some non-bankruptcy professionals appear
in bankruptcy cases from time to time, but this does not seem to be a
robust source of information about the market rates for nonbankruptcy professional services. In short, as bankruptcy professionals
themselves, Fee Controllers’ first-hand knowledge of non-bankruptcy
fees is necessarily limited.
128

Until professionals are sufficiently senior to appear in court, it is unclear where
many Fee Controllers would become personally acquainted with those professionals.
To the extent that firms continue to employ an “up or out” model, this suggests that
most professionals working on a case will be virtually unknown to Fee Controllers. See
Up or Out, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Up_or_out (last visited Oct. 24,
2015).
129
To the extent Fee Controllers believe they know professionals involved in a case,
it is likely because that professional has appeared in a prior bankruptcy case. Since
Fee Controllers know the professionals who are repeat players, this means that they
know the older and more experienced bankruptcy professionals. Thus, they may know
the more skilled professionals, which can skew their perceptions of the aggregate body
of all professionals toward a more favorable perception.
130
11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(F) (2011).
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Even though Fee Controllers lack sufficient first-hand
information about both bankruptcy professionals and their
comparably skilled non-bankruptcy brethren, Fee Controllers have an
alternative method for obtaining this information. Bankruptcy
professionals are required to file fee applications that, among other
things, must “contain sufficient information about the case and the
applicant so that the court, the creditors, and the United States Trustee
can review it without searching for relevant information in other
documents.”131 In addition, the United States Trustees’ Office recently
promulgated new Fee Guidelines covering professional disclosures in
mega-bankruptcy cases.132
Among other things, bankruptcy
professionals in mega-bankruptcy cases now have comparable
compensation disclosure obligations. Unfortunately, these Guidelines
are both too new to have a sufficient track record to judge their
efficacy, and apply in only a limited subset of bankruptcy cases.133 As a
result, legitimate concerns remain about where Fee Controllers will
obtain the necessary information to make the § 330 determinations
they are required to make.134
Although the mandatory disclosures are better than nothing,
these disclosures also suffer from limitations. First, the disclosures
related to each professional’s skill and bankruptcy experience tend to
be very limited. For example, in Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP’s fee
applications in the Lehman Brothers cases, the law firm135 disclosed
only the year each associate was admitted to the bar and their practice
group at the firm.136 Although professionals attest that, where possible,
131

28 C.F.R. § 58, app. A(a) (2010); see Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at

126.
132

Fee Guidelines, supra note 19. The new Fee Guidelines have some requirements
that only apply to cases of a certain size.
133
See, e.g., Comment Letter from the N.Y.C. Bar Comm. on Bankr. & Corp. Reorg.
to the Exec. Office for U.S. Trustees at 45 (Jan. 27, 2012),
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072236-CommentLetteronthe
ProposedUSTrusteeGuidelinesforReviewingCompensationReimbursementGuideline
s.pdf (suggesting that the threshold for mega-bankruptcy cases should be increased so
that even fewer cases are covered by the Fee Guidelines); cf. Fennell, supra note 11, at
408.
134
The Guidelines do represent a clear step forward and the United States
Trustees’ office should be commended for its effort.
135
This Article highlights Weil’s fee application because they are one of the most
prominent and successful bankruptcy firms, not to suggest that they are—in any way—
acting less appropriately than other firms. By contrast, in Author’s personal
interactions, they have always acted appropriately. See, e.g., MOVING FORWARD, supra
note 18, at 935 (noting that when Weil served as debtors’ lead counsel, fees were not
higher than when Skadden Arps served as lead counsel).
136
This is the standard practice. All professional fee applications are available
through the Electronic Case Filing system, but are also available at
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they use skilled junior associates and paralegals, these limited
disclosures are insufficient to allow Fee Controllers to determine the
validity of these attestations. Similarly, determining whether a
professional spent a reasonable amount of time on a particular task
requires much more specific information about that particular
professional’s skill and experience. Rough proxies, such as class year,
are not sufficient to make these determinations accurately in most
instances.
Of course, if more substantial disclosures were made—
particularly in the largest bankruptcy cases—Fee Controllers would
need assistance in making good use of that information.137 Under the
current system, Fee Controllers appear overwhelmed by the quantity
of information they must review in the largest cases. Strengthening
chapter 11’s fee control system, therefore, requires both better
information and the ability to make efficient use of that information.
As discussed below, crowdsourcing is well situated to strengthen
chapter 11’s fee control system in precisely these two ways.138
b. Know the Professionals’ Work
The second requirement for an effective fee review is for Fee
Controllers to be intimately familiar with all of the services provided
and work product produced for the case and billed to the estate. The
Code requires Fee Controllers to evaluate whether the professional
services rendered are “reasonably likely to benefit the estate” and
“necessary to the administration of the case.”139 In making these
determinations, Fee Controllers must also determine “whether the
services were performed within a reasonable amount of time
commensurate with the complexity, importance, and nature of the
problem, issue, or task addressed.”140 If these criteria are not met, then
Fee Controllers may not authorize the estate to pay the professionals.
Here, Fee Controllers are likely to have sufficient information but may
not have the ability to efficiently sort through that information to make
the necessary determinations. This is particularly true in the largest
chapter 11 cases.
Suggesting the inability of Fee Controllers to do this job efficiently
is not meant to critique hard-working bankruptcy judges and Assistant
United States Trustees. Instead, this observation is meant to critique a
http://dm.epiq11.com/LBH/Project#.
137
See infra Part III.A.ii.
138
See infra Part III.A.i.
139
11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(A) (2011).
140
§ 330(a)(3)(D).
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system that imposes exceedingly difficult obligations on Fee
Controllers. It is difficult to imagine how one or two people (e.g., a
bankruptcy judge and an Assistant United States Trustee) can
efficiently review all of the professional services provided in a large
bankruptcy case.141 As a result, many Fee Controllers likely rely on their
(considerable) experience with chapter 11 cases to determine—in a
general way—what is appropriate in an average case, and then
extrapolate from that experience to a particular case. But § 330
appears to require more particularized determinations of
reasonableness.
Fee Controllers must rely on disclosures made by estate-paid
professionals in their fee applications to understand what services were
provided in a particular case.142 Unlike the disclosures related to the
skill and experience of the estate-paid professionals, these disclosures
are very robust. For example, in Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP’s tenth
interim fee application in the Lehman Brothers cases, the firm
provided approximately twenty pages describing, in narrative form, all
of the work it provided to the estate and thereby sought to justify the
almost forty-one million dollars in compensation it requested.143 In
addition to the interim fee applications, firms often file a monthly fee
application listing all of the work performed by each professional in
increments of time as small as six minutes.144 If Fee Controllers were
141

Or even in a host of small cases and even with the help of the judges’ law clerks.
Fee Controllers are not personally familiar with all of the services provided to
parties-in-interest and billed to the estate because most of the activity in large chapter
11 cases happens outside of court, particularly for the non-legal professionals. In the
largest chapter 11 cases, estate-paid professionals will request hundreds of millions of
dollars in compensation for work that takes place outside the watchful gaze of Fee
Controllers. But even in smaller cases, a large percentage of work will not occur in
court. Therefore, while the dollar figures will be smaller, it will remain difficult for
Fee Controllers to be personally familiar with all of the work that the estate is being
asked to pay for.
Because most professional compensation is earned for out-of-court work, it is
inherently difficult for Fee Controllers to know if every person present at every
meeting performed services “reasonably likely to benefit the estate” or “necessary to
the administration of the case.” § 330(a)(4)(A); see also In re Fleming Cos., 304 B.R.
85, 91 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (requiring “all professionals attending a hearing to have
a role. [Therefore,] [i]f two or more professionals are billing time, they each should
make a contribution.”) (quoting In re Jefsaba, 172 B.R. 786, 809–10 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1994)); Schratz, supra note 59, at 169 (collecting cases where courts cut fees across-theboard even though all attorneys were prepared for and participated in hearings
because those courts found that the professionals had duplicated efforts).
143
Once again, Weil is highlighted because it is one of the most prominent
bankruptcy firms and not to reproach it.
144
See, e.g., Procedures for Monthly Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses, U.S.
BANKR. CT. S.D.N.Y. (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/
files/2016-1-c-procedures.pdf.
142
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able to closely review these enormously detailed fee disclosures, they
could gain a more complete understanding of all the work performed
in the case. But, particularly in the largest cases, the volume of these
disclosures must often be overwhelming.145 As a result, Fee Controllers
may often lack the ability to review every time and expense entry and
to confirm that each professional’s billing records align with those of
other professionals.
In order to make efficient use of the information being disclosed
by the professionals, Fee Controllers need additional assistance to both
identify work that was potentially unnecessary, duplicative, or wasteful,
and to review that work product to aid in finally determining whether
the work is compensable. As explained below, crowdsourcing can
provide this assistance.146
c. Compare the Professionals’ Work to the Charges for
That Work
The third aspect of an effective fee review requires that Fee
Controllers compare the work product produced or services rendered
to the charges billed for those services.147 This is time-consuming work,
because it may require a close reading of the work product and the
astute mind of a professional reviewer to determine if the work product
was appropriate to draft and, if appropriate, to determine if the work
product was produced efficiently.148 In addition, bankruptcy judges
can only approve the requested compensation if they have considered
the time spent as compared to the “complexity, importance, and
nature of the problem, issue, or task addressed.”149 Although many Fee
Controllers are very experienced with reviewing fee applications and
making these determinations, the sheer volume of fee applications in
a large chapter 11 case makes this an onerous (if not impossible)
task.150 And when coupled with the issues noted above—not knowing
the professionals’ billing time to the estate and not having a chance to
review much of the work product—fee review becomes exceedingly
difficult to do well under the current system.
145

See In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 601 n.1 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker,
J., concurring).
146
See infra Part III.
147
See Harold Lavien, Fees as Seen from the Bankruptcy Bench, 89 COM. L.J. 136, 136
(1984).
148
Although innovative solutions, including the use of specialized computer
software, could alleviate the burden on Fee Controllers to do this work, this work
continues to—generally—be done by Fee Controllers and by hand.
149
See 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(D) (2011); see also supra Part II.A.
150
See supra notes 94–98.
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In sum, Fee Controllers must review the professional fees charged
to the estate in every chapter 11 case to ensure that estate-paid
professionals are not benefitting at creditors’ expense.151 Yet Fee
Controllers are not properly equipped (and are sometimes
unwilling)152 to adequately complete an effective fee review without
additional assistance.
2. This Difficult Task Engenders Seemingly Inaccurate
Assumptions
Given the “grinding” nature of an effective fee audit, Fee
Controllers may understandably be disinclined to thoroughly review
every fee application filed, even in small and medium-sized chapter 11
cases.153 In fact, some courts have acknowledged that they examine
only a subset of fee and expense entries, and then extrapolate from
that sample. For example, in In re Maruko, Inc., the bankruptcy court
sampled a discrete number of time entries and then ordered a 30%
across-the-board reduction because it determined that the professional
had billed the estate for some unnecessary or unreasonable work in
the sampled time entries.154 The court merely sampled the fee
applications instead of doing a full review of every time and expense
entry because a full review would have been too onerous.155 While this
approach has much to offer (under the demands of the current fee
control system), it appears at odds with congressional demands,
particularly if courts are not well-versed in statistical sampling
methods.
Other courts appear disinclined to perform a fee audit, assuming
that their oversight role is either unnecessary or a waste of time. As a
result, some courts assume that (i) bankruptcy professionals exercise

151

See, e.g., In re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 19 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994).
Although some judges have very publicly acknowledged their disdain for fee
control, this Article presumes that most Fee Controller wish to do the best job possible.
Id. at 845 n.12 (“[I]t [does] not befit[] the stature of a federal bankruptcy judge to
spend wasteful hours poring over fee applications . . . .”) (emphasis added); cf.
Christine Simmons, Fee Auditors Rare in Bankruptcies: In Four Years of Examining, Only
One
Auditor
Turns
Up,
MO .
LAW.
WKLY.
(Mar.
14,
2011),
www.legalcost.com/press/press_55.pdf (stating that “auditing a fee application is a
grind”).
153
Simmons, supra note 152.
154
In re Maruko, Inc. 160 B.R. 633, 641 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1993).
155
Id.; see also In re Bank of New England Corp., 142 B.R. 584, 586 (D. Mass. 1992)
(“[C]ourts should not spend [] nonexistent Court resources to track down every entry,
correlate them against other fee applications, and . . . delete those entries insufficiently
substantiated . . . .”) (all except the first alteration in original) (citations omitted).
152
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billing judgment,156 (ii) the market for chapter 11 professional services
will discipline overcharging professionals,157 and (iii) that “[i]t is almost
impossible to ‘second guess’ the proper amount of time that counsel
should have spent on a particular matter.”158 By making these
assumptions, Fee Controllers may feel justified in declining to don
their green eyeshades and dig through towering stacks of fee
applications. All three of these assumptions, however, appear
incorrect, and none appear to justify a court’s failure to take seriously
its fee review obligations.
Not only do the aforementioned assumptions fail to justify
abdicating judicial responsibility for fee control, but they also seem to
be at odds with modern chapter 11 billing practices.159 The assumption
regarding billing judgment has been thoroughly discussed above and
those arguments will not be retread here.160 Instead, this Article begin
with the second assumption—that professional compensation in
chapter 11 is market-driven. This assumption also appears to be
erroneous. Professional services providers in bankruptcy cases are not
subject to the same market pressures as firms outside of bankruptcy.161
Once the bankruptcy court approves a professional firm’s retention,
there are incentives to charge the estate as much as possible. As such,
professional firms may treat their fee applications as the opening bid
in a negotiation, a bid that Fee Controllers can disapprove.162 Without
price pressure from clients, objections from other parties-in-interest,
or a close examination by Fee Controllers, professional service
providers are simply not constrained by a functioning market or
anything approximating one.163 As a result, it should be no surprise
156

See In re Jefsaba, Inc., 172 B.R. 786, 798 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (court expects
that “unproductive time will be written off”); see also Schratz, supra note 59.
157
See, e.g., In re Jefsaba, Inc., 172 B.R. at 797 (citing In re Busy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs.,
Inc., 19 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994)); In re Patronek, 121 B.R. 728, 731 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1990).
158
In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 49 B.R. 467, 472 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985)
(commenting on the difficulty in proving “that an issue was illusory, irrelevant or
frivolous or that too many facts and transcript references had been marshaled”).
159
See generally Fortney, supra note 88.
160
See supra text accompanying note 78; see also Fortney, supra note 88.
161
See supra text accompanying notes 104–11.
162
Hirsch, supra note 14, at 1348 (describing why professionals may “hedge” their
fee requests when they know they “may be subject to disallowance or discounting by
the court upon review”); see also MOVING FORWARD, supra note 18, at 936 (reporting on
“the apparent lack of impact which the appointment of a fee examiner has on
professional fees in chapter 11 cases”).
163
See David Orozco, Democratizing the Law: Legal Crowdsourcing (‘Lawsourcing’) as a
Means to Achieve Legal, Regulatory, and Policy Objectives, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. (forthcoming
2016) (manuscript available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2520515) (stating that a

BRUCKNER (DO NOT DELETE)

1/28/2016 12:24 PM

2016] CROWDSOURCING (BANKRUPTCY) FEE CONTROL

393

when chapter 11’s fee control system fails to rein in unreasonably high
fees.
Clients may also be complicit in this overcharging. As noted
above,164 courts review professional fees because clients do not.165 After
all, most or all of that cost is likely to be borne by someone else.166 Thus,
when the bankruptcy court in In re Patronek, suggested that “the proper
measure of what fee is reasonable in any context is ascertainment of
what an informed client and an informed attorney would agree should
be paid for certain services,” it missed the mark.167 Using informed
clients as a benchmark is difficult because informed clients may be
willing to pay almost anything for the best possible representation and
their professionals are likely willing to bill the estate for any services
that might be remotely useful for their client, if they think the estate
will reimburse them.168 With no party able to create effective price
pressure on professional firms, the cost of professional representation
in bankruptcy cases has unsurprisingly risen at five times the rate of
inflation recently.169
The third assumption Fee Controllers make is that secondguessing a bankruptcy professional’s billing judgment is impossible.170
But it may only be impossible because of the current design of chapter
11’s fee control system. In the absence of routine objections to
professional fee applications,171 it is difficult for Fee Controllers to
focus their attention on instances of potential abuse.172 Because the fee
functional market is expected to put strong price pressure on law firms and should
result in a reticence to pay for associates’ time if those associated are overused).
Although Stephen Lubben argues that the bankruptcy market works no worse than
the non-bankruptcy market, it is not clear whether this is an indictment of legal billing
generally or contrary evidence suggesting that bankruptcy bills are like the
temperature of baby bear’s soup in Goldilocks. That is, they are “just right.” TOM
ROBERTS, GOLIDLOCKS AND THE THREE BEARS (1990); Lubben, The Microeconomics of
Chapter 11, supra note 3.
164
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
165
Even if clients do review fees, when they uncover apparent professional
overcharging, the objective evidence suggests that they do not share this information
with Fee Controllers. Perhaps this is because the existing financial incentives are
poorly aligned to encourage information-sharing. By contrast, a crowdsourced fee
control system would enable Fee Controllers to take advantage of the varying
incentives that might drive creditors (or other information holders) to disclose to Fee
Controllers when they identify potentially inappropriate professional fees or expenses.
166
See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at 137.
167
121 B.R. 728, 731 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990).
168
See supra note 107.
169
See supra note 16.
170
See, e.g., In re Consol. Bancshares, Inc., 49 B.R. 467, 472 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985).
171
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
172
See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at 131 (claiming that
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application and review process “provides the one real opportunity to
control professional costs under the current system,” it is important to
strengthen chapter 11’s fee control system.173
The current fee control system often results in ineffective fee
reviews. As a result, courts seldom make substantial cuts to the fees
requested,174 despite evidence (and the widespread belief) that a large
number of bankruptcy professionals perform unnecessary work.175 In
Part II, this Article introduces crowdsourcing and provides three
examples of how companies have used crowdsourcing to solve similar
problems as those faced by Fee Controllers. In other words,
crowdsourcing may offer solutions to chapter 11’s fee control problem,
including the need for better information-gathering, informationprocessing, coordination tools, and harnessing the wisdom of crowds
to develop innovative solutions.
II. WHAT IS CROWDSOURCING?
Offering a simple definition for crowdsourcing is harder than one
might expect because the word lacks a widely agreed-upon
definition.176 Jeff Howe, who is widely credited with coining the term,
defined crowdsourcing as a process by which employees and suppliers
are replaced by an undefined, but generally large group of individuals
identified via an open call on the Internet.177 By contrast, Wikipedia—
often described as an example of a successful crowdsourcing
project178—defines crowdsourcing as “the process of obtaining needed
only approximately 20% of all fee applications receive any objection, and that most of
those objections are brought by the United States Trustee for violations of narrow,
technical rules that involve only small dollar amounts); see also Whelan et al., supra note
120, at 408 (claiming that chapter 11’s professional compensation scheme “is subject
to abuses”).
173
Baker, supra note 17, at 57–58.
174
See Lavien, supra note 147, at 137; see also LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL
FEES, supra note 41, at 257 (suggesting that corporate bankruptcy cases tend to cost far
more than we would expect).
175
See Ross, supra note 20, at 3.
176
Enrique Estellés-Arolas & Fernando González-Ladrón-de-Guevara, Towards an
Integrated Crowdsourcing Definition, 38 J. INFO. SCI. 189 (2012).
177
Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED (June 1, 2006, 12:00 PM), http://
archive.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html. See also Orozco, supra note
163.
178
A distinction is sometimes drawn between crowdsourcing, where the benefits of
the crowd’s wisdom accrue to the person or entity positing the problem to be solved,
and open source, where the benefits are returned to the crowd itself. See, e.g., Daren
C. Brabham, Crowdsourcing as a Model for Problem Solving: An Introduction and Cases, 14
CONVERGENCE 75, 81–82 (2008) [hereinafter Brabham, Crowdsourcing as a Model]. This
Article accepts this sensible distinction between open source and crowdsourcing, and
thus would consider Wikipedia to be an open-source project and not a crowdsourced
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services, ideas, or content by soliciting contributions from a large
group of people, and especially from an online community, rather
than from traditional employees or suppliers.”179 This Article will use
a definition similar to Wikipedia’s, and defines crowdsourcing as any
problem-solving method that generates solutions by drawing on the
wisdom of crowds.180
To help illustrate what crowdsourcing is and how it can work, the
next section provides three examples of how crowdsourcing has been
used to solve some problems relevant to fixing chapter 11’s fee control
system. The first two examples are examples of how companies have
embraced crowdsourcing as a solution to information gaps and the
need for contingent workers, among other problems. The final
example discusses a crowdsourcing platform that can be used by any
company or individual with a problem to solve, particularly if they have
a tedious but divisible problem. Among other things, these examples
demonstrate that crowdsourcing: (i) is a useful tool for information
gathering, including information about complex problems requiring
specialized knowledge; (ii) can help divide large, tedious tasks into
digestible chunks that can be solved by interested members of the
crowd; (iii) allows the participation of non-experts, who often develop
innovative solutions that bankruptcy professionals might never
consider; and (iv) can be vastly cheaper than paying bankruptcy
professionals for the same work. These four benefits explain
crowdsourcing’s intuitive appeal for enhancing (and not displacing)
chapter 11’s fee control system.
A. The Goldcorp Challenge
In 2000, a troubled Canadian gold mining company, Goldcorp,
Inc., turned to crowdsourcing to solve its problems. Goldcorp was
project because Wikipedia’s entries are “free content.” Wikipedia: FAQ/Overview,
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:FAQ/Overview#WHO
(last visited Nov. 22, 2015). As so defined, the solution offered in this Article may
include aspects of both crowdsourcing and open sourcing, but this Article uses the
crowdsourcing nomenclature nonetheless.
179
Crowdsourcing, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crowdsourcing (last
visited
Oct.
25,
2015)
(quoting
Crowdsourcing,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/crowdsourcing (retrieved Feb. 3,
2014)).
180
“[U]nder the right circumstances, groups are remarkably intelligent, and are
often smarter than the smartest people in them.” See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM
OF CROWDS xiii (2004); see also Brabham, Crowdsourcing the Public Participation Process,
supra note 12, at 250; see generally Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal
Theory, 2009 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2009) (suggesting that many minds are better than
one because they more efficiently aggregate information, but only in some
circumstances).
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“[b]esieged by strikes, lingering debts, and an exceedingly high cost of
production.”181 To make matters worse, the gold market was
contracting.182 The company’s troubles were so severe that it had
ceased its mining operations.183 Although Goldcorp’s CEO, Rob
McEwen, believed the company owned valuable property, the
company’s in-house geological team had not been able to reliably
locate gold veins nor to estimate the amount of gold they would find
in any particular vein.184 In response, McEwen took an unprecedented
step for his industry and published his company’s confidential and
proprietary geological data on the Internet. In addition, the company
offered more than half a million dollars in prize money to the team(s)
that submitted the best estimates of where the company should mine
and how much gold particular mines would contain.185 The results
were nothing short of miraculous, and it seems fair to say that
crowdsourcing solved the company’s financial woes.
Crowdsourcing produced results for Goldcorp that were so
stunning that they nearly caused the CEO to fall out of his chair when
he saw them.186 News spread fast that the company had put “400
megabytes worth of data about the 55,000 acre site . . . on the
company’s website.”187 Within only a few weeks, submissions poured
in. Eventually, more than 1000 “virtual prospectors” from fifty
countries reviewed the company’s data.188 In addition to an army of
geologists, the company received submissions applying solutions from
fields as diverse as “math, advanced physics, intelligent systems,
181

Don Tapscott & Anthony D. Williams, Innovation in the Age of Mass Collaboration,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 1, 2007), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/stories/2007-0201/innovation-in-the-age-of-mass-collaborationbusinessweek-business-news-stockmarket-and-financial-advice.
182
The contraction was so severe that the price of an ounce of gold fell below
Goldcorp’s extraction costs. The GoldCorp Challenge and the Beginning of Crowdsourced
Analytics, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE VIA QUANTITATIVE METHODS (Feb. 22, 2012),
http://cavqm.blogspot.com/2012/02/goldcorp-challenge-and-beginning-of.html
[hereinafter COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE].
183
With the price of gold falling below Goldcorp’s extraction costs, if they had
continued to mine, they would have lost money with each ounce of gold they extracted
from the ground. See Tapscott & Williams, supra note 181.
184
Id.
185
Open
Innovation:
Goldcorp
Challenge,
IDEACONNECTION,
http://www.ideaconnection.com/open-innovation-success/Open-InnovationGoldcorp-Challenge-00031.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Open
Innovation].
186
See Tapscott & Williams, supra note 181.
187
Id.
188
Id.; see Linda Tischler, He Struck Gold on the Net (Really), FAST COMPANY (May 31,
2002, 5:00 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/44917/he-struck-gold-net-really
(putting the number at more than 1400 participants).
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computer graphics, and organic solutions.”189 Many of the virtual
prospectors employed methods that had never before been used in the
mining industry, and the results were impressive.190
The prize-winning entry resulted from collaboration between two
Australian groups, Fractal Graphics and Taylor Wall & Associates, and
employed a novel technological solution.191
Together, these
companies developed a 3-D map of the mining site that enabled
Goldcorp to see the potential in one of its primary assets.192 The
Australian prospectors identified more than 110 sites, half of which the
company’s in-house team had not previously identified. In addition,
the Australian prospectors were accurate, uncovering “significant gold
reserves” in more than 80% of their targets.193 Notably, these firms
reportedly earned less in prize money than they normally charged for
their services; perhaps acting in pursuit of publicity for their efforts.194
Goldcorp’s crowdsourcing experiment yielded phenomenal
results. The company saved years of exploration time and increased
its production by 851%.195 It also reduced its per-ounce extraction costs
by approximately 84%, going from $360 per ounce to $59 per ounce.196
In the end, it successfully mined over six billion dollars in gold as a
result of the challenge.197 For an approximately half-million dollar
investment, Goldcorp was catapulted from an “under-performing $100
million company into a $9 billion juggernaut while transforming a
backwards mining site in Northern Ontario into one of the most
innovative and profitable properties in the industry.”198
Several lessons can be drawn from this example.
First,
crowdsourcing need not be limited to small, simple problems but can
be used to develop solutions to complex challenges. Second and
related, crowds can bring specialized knowledge to bear. Third, the
crowd may offer interesting and unexpected perspectives on problems,
such as a 3-D map, that may be surprisingly effective. Fourth,
crowdsourcing may be cheaper than the existing alternatives because
189

See Tapscott & Williams, supra note 181.
See id.
191
See id.; see also Tischler, supra note 188.
192
See Tischler, supra note 188.
193
Open Innovation, supra note 185.
194
See The Goldcorp Challenge—Who Has Replicated It Successfully?, QUORA,
http://www.quora.com/The-Goldcorp-Challenge-who-has-replicated-it-successfully
(last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
195
See COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 182.
196
See id.; see also Tischler, supra note 188.
197
Open Innovation, supra note 185.
198
See Tapscott & Williams, supra note 181.
190
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members of the crowd may be incentivized by non-monetary rewards.199
B. Proctor and Gamble Crowdsources Research and Development
For more than a decade, Proctor and Gamble (“P&G”) has
enthusiastically embraced crowdsourcing.200
P&G is a leading
201
consumer goods company, a company whose brands are household
staples such as Pantene shampoo, Crest toothpaste, Tide laundry
detergent, and Pampers diapers.202 The company sells its products in
almost every country in the world.203 In 2014, P&G sold more than
eighty-four billion dollars in goods and delivered more than eleven
billion dollars in profits.204 But, despite its global reach and robustly
funded in-house research and development (“R&D”) team, P&G
decided to share its “R&D, consumer understanding, marketing
expertise, and brand equity” in order to bring “great innovations to
market and into the lives of consumers faster.”205 As a result of the
company’s “open innovation strategy,” it has established “more than
2,000 successful agreements with innovation partners around the
world.”206
In short, P&G has embraced crowdsourcing and
crowdsourcing has produced valuable results.
P&G turned to crowdsourcing only after its own internal
innovation program had stopped being particularly innovative,
causing its share price to fall.207 R&D had long been at the core of the
company’s success, but its R&D department’s performance had
slipped.208 New product launches were no longer as successful as they
had been in the past. Despite an already large R&D budget, P&G tried
199

The GoldCorp Challenge, supra note 194.
See
Connect
+
Develop,
P&G
CONNECT
+
DEVELOP,
http://www.pgconnectdevelop.com/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Connect
+ Develop] (“This site has been created to help external innovators and companies
learn how to submit innovations to P&G’s Connect + Develop. Connect + Develop is
P&G’s program for encouraging open innovation, also known as crowdsourcing.”).
201
Proctor & Gamble, FORTUNE 500, http://fortune.com/fortune500/proctergamble-32/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2015) [hereinafter P&G Fortune 500].
202
See P&G Connect+Develop Launches New Open Innovation Website, P&G CONNECT +
DEVELOP (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.pgconnectdevelop.com/home/stories/cdstories/20130207-pg-connectdevelop-launches-new-open-innovation-website.html.
203
Connect + Develop, supra note 200 (noting that P&G has “more than 300 brands
in more than 180 countries”).
204
P&G Fortune 500, supra note 201.
205
Connect + Develop, supra note 200.
206
Id.
207
Tim Kastelle, Proctor & Gamble as an Open Innovation Case Study,
CROWDSOURCING.ORG (June 7, 2012, 5:26 PM), http://www.crowdsourcing.org/
editorial/procter-gamble-as-an-open-innovation-case-study/15445.
208
Id.
200
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to fix the problem by increasing that budget further. After several
years of trying to re-ignite its internal R&D team’s innovative fire with
additional resources, P&G decided to try crowdsourcing.209
By embracing crowdsourcing, P&G has been able to turn itself
around. It has entered into a wide array of deals with external
innovators, including academic partnerships, joint ventures,
trademark-licensing agreements, patent-licensing arrangements, and
more.210 By leveraging crowd wisdom,211 the company has begun
innovating again, has successfully launched many new products,212 and
has better monetized its patent portfolio.213 Because the company
embraced crowdsourcing, it has emerged as one of the world’s most
innovative companies and reclaimed its status as a leading consumer
products company.214
As with the Goldcorp Challenge, access to a diverse pool of
potential problem-solvers has been a key to P&G’s successful
turnaround. Notably, P&G does not crowdsource only through its own
website, but has partnered with other companies that help
crowdsource solutions, such as InnoCentive.215 InnoCentive also draws
from a very diverse group of potential “solvers.” Although some
“solvers” have formal expertise in areas related to the problems they
attempt to solve, others are merely hobbyists “working from their
proverbial garage.”216
Perhaps counter-intuitively, a study of
InnoCentive found that “the odds of a solver’s success increased in
fields in which they had no formal expertise.”217 This example clearly
demonstrates the value of non-expert problem-solvers.
209

Id.
See, e.g., Open Innovation Stories, P&G CONNECT + DEVELOP,
http://www.pgconnectdevelop.com/home/stories/in-out-licensing/20130108bounce-fabric-softener.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
211
“Critical components of more than 35 percent of the company’s initiatives were
generated outside P&G.” Howe, supra note 177.
212
Successful product launches occur more than one-half of the time now instead
of only one-third of the time. Kastelle, supra note 207.
213
Going from less than 10% of patents in use in products to more than 50%. Id.
214
Katie Jacobs, How to Build an Innovative Company, HR (Jan. 21, 2013),
http://www.hrmagazine.co.uk/hr/features/1075996/how-build-innovative-company.
215
InnoCentive is a platform for crowdsourcing solutions to complex problems.
The “seekers” pay “solvers” anywhere from $10,000 to $100,000 per solution, and its
solvers have cracked more than 30% of the problems posted on the site, “which is 30
percent more than would have been solved using a traditional, in-house approach.”
Howe, supra note 177.
216
Id.
217
Id. (citing Karim R. Lakhani et al., The Value of Openness in Scientific Problem
Solving,
(Harv.
Bus.
Sch.,
Working
Paper
No.
07-050,
2006),
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/07-050.pdf).
210
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Once again, there are some larger lessons to be learned from
P&G’s example. First, P&G’s in-house team was already very large
(9000 people), but crowdsourcing gave the company access to a
significantly larger (1.5 million) pool of contingent workers.218
Second, these contingent problem-solvers came from a diverse
background and devised more creative solutions to P&G’s problems
than its in-house R&D team. Third, P&G was able to leverage the ideas
of others to re-establish itself as the preeminent consumer products
company (i.e., much of crowdsourcing’s benefits inured to P&G’s
benefit instead of the crowd). Fourth, the crowd workers were able to
handle complex jobs, and do so at a price that is a mere fraction of the
value of their ideas.219
C. Amazon Mechanical Turk and “Microtasking”
Introduced in 2005,220 Amazon Mechanical Turk (“mTurk”) is a
crowdsourcing platform intended to “give businesses and developers
access to an on-demand, scalable workforce” and to allow workers to
work on appealing projects at times that are convenient for them. 221
MTurk coordinates “the use of human intelligence to perform tasks
that computers are currently unable to do.”222 This crowdsourcing
platform allows companies and individuals (“Requestors”) to post
Human Intelligence Tasks (“HITs”) that they would like
accomplished. HITs are “typically simple enough to require only a few
minutes to be completed” and payments for such tasks can be as low as
one cent.223 While HITs can be more complicated, take longer, and

218

Id. (quoting Larry Huston, Procter & Gamble’s vice president of innovation and
knowledge, as saying: “We have 9,000 people on our R&D staff and up to 1.5 million
researchers working through our external networks.”).
219
The wages paid to crowdworkers is a contentious issue. See, e.g., Karën Fort et
al., Amazon Mechanical Turk: Gold Mine or Coal Mine?, 37 COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS
413 (2011), http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/COLI_a_00057.
220
Id. at 414.
221
Mechanical Turk Is a Market Place for Work, AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK,
https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
222
In short, most HITs require the decision-maker to make judgment calls that
computers are not currently well equipped to make. Amazon Mechanical Turk,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amazon_ Mechanical_Turk (last visited
Nov. 22, 2015). Incidentally, this is also where the name comes from; the original
Mechanical Turk was an “18th century chess playing ‘automaton’ that was in fact
operated by a concealed person.” Gabriele Paolacci et al., Running Experiments on
Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 411 (2010).
223
Some HITs are listed as paying nothing at all, though many of these seem to be
test HITs. See All HITs, AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/
mturk/findhits?match=false! (last visited Nov. 22, 2015).
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pay more, they still rarely pay more than one dollar.224 Sample tasks
might include translating a single English language sentence into
Urdu, annotating documents, tagging images or audio transcriptions,
or completing a survey.225
For Requestors, mTurk offers several challenges and benefits.
The primary challenges are to divide complex tasks into basic steps, to
fix an appropriate (and usually very low) reward, and to define
successful completion.226
Quality control is also a potential
challenge,227 but it is a seemingly surmountable one.228 Among other
techniques, Requestors can require that workers (usually referred to as
“Turkers”) pre-qualify before accepting any HITs, which seems to
improve the quality of responses.229 Requestors are also free to accept
or reject any work done by a Turker, although mTurk tracks this data
and a high rejection rate makes it harder to attract Turkers to the
Requestor’s future HITs.230
Finally, Turkers are classified as
independent contractors and thus are not subject to certain labor law
obligations that would arise if Turkers were classified as employees.231
224

For example, on January 23, 2015, mTurk listed 277,871 HITs available and only
409 of those HITs paid more than one dollar. HIT Search Results (Jan. 23, 2015) (on
file with Author). Some of those HITs, however, paid more than fifty dollars each. Id.;
see also Aniket Kittur et al., CrowdForge: Crowdsourcing Complex Work, PROC. 24TH ANN.
ACM SYMP. ON USER INTERFACE SOFTWARE & TECH. 2011, at 43,
http://ra.adm.cs.cmu.edu/anon/anon/hcii/CMU-HCII-11-100.pdf (reporting that
the modal HIT in this study paid three cents).
225
Fort et al., supra note 219 (Urdu and annotation examples); Paolacci et al., supra
note 222, at 412 (tagging and survey examples); see also Episode 600: The People Inside
MONEY
(Mar.
31,
2015,
11:13
AM),
Your
Machine,
PLANET
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2015/01/30/382657657/episode-600-thepeople-inside-your-machine.
226
Fort et al., supra note 219, at 414.
227
Id. at 415.
228
Requestors have used a variety of techniques to ensure quality results, including:
(i) providing above-average payments; (ii) incorporating some sort of reputation score
for Turkers; (iii) building the Requestor’s reputation with Turkers; (iv) identifying
intrinsically motivated people; and (v) having the Requestor directly verify a sample of
the results. Catherine E. Schmitt-Sands & Richard J. Smith, Prospects for Online
Crowdsourcing of Social Science Research Tasks: A Case Study Using Amazon
Mechanical Turk (Jan. 9, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2377016; see also Julie S. Downs et al., Are Your Participants
Gaming the System? Screening Mechanical Turk Workers, PROC. SIGCHI CONF. ON HUM.
FACTORS COMPUTING SYS., 2010, at 2399, http://lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/note1552downs.pdf (discussing screening workers in advance as a quality-control technique).
229
Amazon Mechanical Turk, supra note 222. See also Schmitt-Sands & Smith, supra
note 228.
230
Amazon Mechanical Turk, supra note 222. See also Schmitt-Sands & Smith, supra
note 228 (finding that the Requestor’s reputation was an important determinant in
worker quality).
231
See Fort et al., supra note 219, at 414 (labeling mTurk as “an unregulated labor
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Despite some concerns about the service facilitating a “digital
sweatshop,” mTurk has been successful in a variety of applications.232
These successful applications include: (i) conducting experimental
research;233 (ii) writing articles;234 (iii) identifying duplicate entries and
verifying the details of item entries;235 and (iv) collecting information.236
These latter two applications are particularly relevant to fee control.
Chapter 11’s fee control system is less effective than it could be because
Fee Controllers lack the best information available regarding, among
other things, instances of potential overcharging. Also, the system’s
enforcers need assistance reviewing the information that they do
receive, and would benefit from outsourcing some aspects of the fee
control process to workers who could quickly, inexpensively, and
accurately review fee applications.
These examples were intended to help explain what
crowdsourcing is and what it can do. They have also hinted at
crowdsourcing’s potential in the bankruptcy realm. With that, this
Article will now provide a deeper look into how crowdsourcing can
improve chapter 11’s fee control system in several specific ways. The
following part of this Article will also discuss some core issues that
would need to be addressed before fully implementing a crowdsourced
fee control system.
III. CROWDSOURCING FEE CONTROL
Our current fee control system is ineffective because it burdens
Fee Controllers with the task of deterring and preventing
unreasonable or unnecessary professional fees without providing them
with adequate tools to make that burden bearable.237 Fee Controllers
could do a better job of fee control if they had additional assistance in
at least three areas: (i) information-gathering; (ii) informationmarketplace: a system which deliberately does not pay fair wages, does not pay due
taxes, and provides no protections for workers”).
232
See, e.g., Ellen Cushing, Amazon Mechanical Turk: The Digital Sweatshop, UTNE
(Jan./Feb. 2013), http://www.utne.com/science-and-technology/
amazonmechanical-turk-zm0z13jfzlin.aspx#ixzz3PgZ2MnIC.
233
See Paolacci et al., supra note 222, at 413.
234
See Kittur et al., supra note 224 (finding that article writing went “surprisingly
well”).
235
Amazon Mechanical Turk, supra note 222 (describing how mTurk can be used to
find duplicative listing in yellow pages directories, identify duplicate entries in online
product catalogs, and verify details of restaurants, such as hours of operation).
236
Id. (describing how mTurk can be used to collect information, such as by
searching “data elements or specific fields in large government and legal documents”).
237
See supra notes 94–98. But see Hirsch, supra note 14.
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processing; and (iii) innovation. First, Fee Controllers need better
information about bankruptcy professionals and their work product to
improve their § 330 determinations. They would also benefit if others
would help highlight specific instances of potential professional
overcharging. Second, Fee Controllers need additional resources to
make efficient use of this information. Without the ability to efficiently
process the information they receive, additional information (even if
it is better information) will not improve chapter 11’s fee control
system. Finally, chapter 11’s fee control system would benefit from
innovation. Without changes in these three areas, chapter 11’s fee
control system is likely to remain unable to control certain types of
professional overcharging.238
As suggested by the three examples from the previous section of
this Article, crowdsourcing can help fix chapter 11’s broken fee
control system by offering solutions in each of its three problem areas.
It also bears repeating that crowdsourcing can simply be an additional
tool to improve chapter 11’s fee control system. For example, in P&G’s
case, the company already had a well-established R&D department, but
it turned to crowdsourcing because it allowed the company to do
better than it could do otherwise. Similarly, there is a role for
crowdsourcing in chapter 11’s fee control system to support
bankruptcy judges, Assistant United States Trustees and fee examiners,
who already perform many fee control tasks. Crowdsourcing need not
displace Fee Controllers, but could serve to supplement their efforts to
control the cost of corporate bankruptcy cases.
In essence, determining the appropriate fees in a bankruptcy case
is predicated on solving the following problem: how to solicit the
optimal amount of professional services without overpaying for those
services. This problem—like any problem that can be clearly framed
and where the relevant data can be made available to interested
problem-solvers—can be crowdsourced.239 The complexity of the
problem240 and the need for some specialized knowledge241 are not
238

See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at 180 (noting that
too few objections are made for “billing too many hours for the task” because our fee
control “system has no defense against that kind of overcharge”).
239
See Brabham, Crowdsourcing the Public Participation Process, supra note 12, at 252.
240
William D. Eggers & Rob Hamill, Five Ways Crowdsourcing Can Transform the
Public Sphere, GOVERNING (May 23, 2012), http://www.governing.com/columns/
mgmt-insights/col-government-crowdsourcing-five-models.html (discussing how to
crowdsource complex problems that require creative solutions, such as how the city of
Santa Cruz, California effectively crowdsourced solutions to its budget deficit); see also
Brabham, Crowdsourcing the Public Participation Process, supra note 12, at 252.
241
Stephen M. Wolfson & Matthew Lease, Look Before You Leap: Legal Pitfalls of
Crowdsourcing, 48 PROC. AM. SOC’Y FOR INFO. SCI. AND TECH. 1, 2 (2011) (discussing
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barriers to crowdsourcing a solution, as the Goldcorp and P&G
examples help illustrate. If history is any guide, crowdsourcing fee
control ought to result in greater fee reductions because more eyes will
be on professional fee applications.
A. How Crowdsourcing Can Help Fix Chapter 11’s Fee Control System
i. Information Gathering
In a crowdsourced fee control system, additional information
ought to become available to Fee Controllers.242
Currently,
information comes from two primary sources: (i) disclosures by the
professionals seeking to have their initial retention applications or
subsequent fee applications approved; and (ii) objections to retention
and fee applications. Given the evidence of professional overcharging
provided above and how infrequent and modest reductions are, it
seems evident that these sources of information are inadequate. In
other words, this Article assumes that the reason why fee applications
are not cut more regularly and more deeply is Fee Controllers’ inability
to identify many instances of professional overcharging. The evidence
suggests that Fee Controllers could deter or prevent a larger share of
professional overcharging if they had better information.243
This additional information could come from a variety of sources,
including (i) parties-in-interest to the current case, including
bankruptcy professionals;244 (ii) other bankruptcy professionals (i.e.,
crowdsourcing problems that require “specialized skills and a significant time
commitment from the workers”).
242
Eggers & Hamill, supra note 240; see also Michael J. Franklin et al., CrowdDB:
Answering Queries with Crowdsourcing, PROC. 2011 ACM SIGMOD INT’L CONF. ON MGMT.
DATA, 2011, at 61 (noting that dividing a larger task into “microtasks” allows the
participation of people who have no special training and does not require a lot of their
time); Stephen K. Ichatha, The Role of Empowerment in Crowdsourced Customer
Service (May 11, 2013) (unpublished Exec. D.B.A. dissertation, Georgia State
University), http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context
=bus_admin_diss.
243
See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at 189 (fee
applications that are subject to objection tend to be cut more often and more deeply
than those that are not).
244
Attorneys may not be able to receive a monetary reward for assisting Fee
Controllers if they must disclose confidential information about their client in order
to do so. See Jennifer M. Pacella, Advocate or Adversary? When Attorneys Act as
Whistleblowers, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1027, 1046 (2015) (noting that, among others,
the New York County Lawyers’ Association (“NYCLA”) has determined that New York
lawyers may not ethically participate in certain whistleblower bounty programs if they
must reveal confidential client information to receive the bounty). In addition, given
fears of potential retaliation, perhaps it would create a conflict of interest for an
attorney to ever seek a bounty at the same time he or she was representing a client in

BRUCKNER (DO NOT DELETE)

1/28/2016 12:24 PM

2016] CROWDSOURCING (BANKRUPTCY) FEE CONTROL

405

those not involved in the current case);245 (iii) non-bankruptcy
professionals; (iv) persons (professional or otherwise) that have, in
previous cases, interacted with the professionals seeking compensation
in the current case;246 and (v) members of the general public with no
prior involvement in the case or with the professionals.247 Under the
current fee control system, only the first category of people—partiesin-interest to the current case—is invited to participate in the fee
control process. Yet, by and large, these persons do not participate. In
addition, the remaining four categories of people are not entitled to
participate, even if they have information that could help identify
instances of professional overcharging or assist Fee Controllers with
making certain § 330 determinations.
Greater participation in the fee control process, whether via
formal objection or otherwise, is likely to help reduce professional
overcharging.248 With appropriate incentives,249 parties might share a
host of information relevant to the fee control process. For example,
crowdsourcing can help reduce professional overcharging by
incorporating feedback from colleagues and past clients about a
particular professional’s prior billing practices.250 Colleagues and
clients can inform Fee Controllers that this professional has, on
previous occasions, had his or her fees reduced because the judge
found that they had overbilled their clients.251 While clearly not
the current matter. Id. at 1048.
245
Apparently the American Bar Association has expressed a general concern that
“whistleblower awards for attorneys threaten the client right to effective counsel” by
inhibiting the “free flow of information between client attorney and the quality of the
attorney’s representation to the client.” Id. at 104950 (citing Letter from Stephen N.
Zack, President of Am. Bar Ass’n to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (May 20, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-33-10/s73310-315.pdf).
246
The NYCLA has also noted ethical concerns if a lawyer used confidential
information gleaned during a prior representation to his or her client’s detriment in
the future. Id.
247
Although somewhat counterintuitive, research suggests that even non-experts
can be a very valuable source of information, often solving problems that stump the
experts. Brabham, Crowdsourcing the Public Participation Process, supra note 12, at 244.
In addition, a lot of work that happens in a bankruptcy case is not “bankruptcy” work
at all. See Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 23 (highlighting
that non-bankruptcy attorneys are significant contributors to chapter 11 cases).
248
See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41, at 189.
249
How to appropriately incentivize parties to participate in the fee control process
is addressed infra Part III.B.ii.
250
Cf. T. Michael Mather, Twelve Most Common Mistakes by Beginning Attorneys, 26
TEMPLE J. SCI., TECH. & ENVTL. L. 43, 49 (2007) (noting that attorneys’ reputations are
regularly discussed informally by their fellow attorneys).
251
It is not very common for professionals to be called out for their over-billing,
but it does happen. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, The Problem of Inflating Billable Hours,
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dispositive, a robust record of prior fee reductions may encourage Fee
Controllers to take a closer look at that professional’s fee requests in
the current case.252 Furthermore, the additional scrutiny may deter
future overbilling by putting professionals on notice that their actions
in prior cases may be relevant in the current case.
Non-bankruptcy professionals could play an important role in
providing Fee Controllers information about whether the
compensation requested by estate-paid professionals “is reasonable
based on the customary compensation charged by comparably skilled
practitioners” in non-bankruptcy cases.253 This information relating to
customary non-bankruptcy compensation is clearly conducive to
crowdsourcing.254 Consumers of bankruptcy services (i.e., clients)
might be willing to reveal the discounts they received on their bills or
the hourly rates they were charged, which would help Fee Controllers
distinguish between the headline rates advertised and the fees actually
charged to clients. In addition, non-bankruptcy professionals might
be willing to disclose similar information. In other contexts,
consumers regularly volunteer enormous amounts of information
about their experiences for no apparent personal gain.255 For example,
millions of people voluntarily complete product reviews on
Amazon.com for reasons that are not clear.256 Perhaps consumers of
VERDICT (Nov. 17, 2014), http://verdict.justia.com/2014/11/17/problem-inflatingbillable-hours (describing several cases).
252
Cf. Rosen & Bazian, supra note 21, at 44–45 (noting that a party’s prior practices
are highly relevant to certain determinations in the current case) (citing In re
Complaint of Judicial Misconduct (In re Complaint), 761 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2014)). In
In re Complaint, the Ninth Circuit held that a firm’s prior refusal to adhere to certain
court-mandated billing practices was a sufficient basis for denying that firm’s retention
in future cases. The firm’s alleged improprieties came to light because the bankruptcy
judge whose orders were ignored was called upon to approve the firm’s retention in a
new case. Having established that a firm’s shoddy work in previous cases is sufficient
to deny retention in a new case, it is not clear why bankruptcy courts should be the
only parties empowered to bring this information to light, or, if a firm is retained, why
previous impropriety—particularly financial impropriety—should not also be grounds
to take a closer look at a firm’s fee applications in a new case. See Rosen & Bazian,
supra note 21, at 45 (noting that estate-paid professionals may need a reminder “that
their conduct and the quality of their work might have repercussions well beyond those
for the case in which they are currently employed”).
253
11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(F) (2011).
254
Cf. Eggers & Hamill, supra note 240 (discussing how crowdsourcing allows
decision-makers to harness “on-the-ground knowledge from the people who know a
problem intimately”).
255
Fennell, supra note 11, at 392–93.
256
“No doubt developing a reputation for being a top reviewer is a motivation for
some people.” But other reasons are “not at all obvious.” Steven D. Levitt, Why Do
People Post Reviews on Amazon?, FREAKONOMICS (July 22, 2005, 10:05 PM),
http://freakonomics.com/2005/07/22/why-do-people-post-reviews-on-amazon/.
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bankruptcy and comparable professional services could be induced to
act similarly. A crowdsourced fee control system could create “a set of
conditions that both enable and motivate people who possess the
relevant information to reveal it” in order to generate useful
information for Fee Controllers.257
Perhaps most obviously, bankruptcy professionals are likely to
have valuable information that would benefit Fee Controllers. For
example, some bankruptcy professionals involved in the current
matter are likely to have an informed view about whether other estatepaid professionals are requesting excessive compensation, given the
tasks they allegedly completed, either because the tasks took far longer
than appropriate or because the task was unnecessary to perform.
These professionals are likely to develop informed views on these
matters in the course of their work for their own clients. This is
because many estate-paid professionals routinely review the work
produced by other estate-paid professionals in their role as
professional representatives of the estate’s creditors and interest
holders. If, for example, the official committee for the unsecured
creditors files a motion for summary judgment, a variety of estate-paid
professionals, including debtor’s counsel, will review that motion. Now
imagine that those other estate-paid professionals believe that the
motion was improvidently filed due to obviously contested material
facts.258 If those professionals shared that view with the Fee Controllers,
the Fee Controllers might more closely review the relevant fee
application to ensure that the estate does not pay for preparing and
prosecuting a potentially unnecessary or unreasonable summary
judgment motion. In this way, crowdsourcing can piggy-back on the
work already being done by estate-paid professionals to efficiently
evaluate the fee applications of other professionals involved in a
particular bankruptcy case.259
ii. Information Processing
In some cases, Fee Controllers are unable to deter or prevent
professional overcharging because they lack sufficient information,
but in other cases, the problem seems to be that Fee Controllers are

257

Fennell, supra note 11, at 393.
Cf. Brief for the Neutral Fee Examiners, supra note 56.
259
This piggy-backing quality also helps explain why a crowdsourced fee control
system may be less expensive than the current system, which relies on wholly
disinterested parties such as fee examiners who must review all of the work produced
as part of their fee control duties.
258
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presented with too much information.260 In such cases, Fee Controllers
may inadvertently ignore useful information because they cannot sort
the useful information from the useless information. Crowdsourcing
should be able to assist Fee Controllers with processing the
information they receive in order to identify instances of professional
overcharging. One advantage of crowdsourcing, as suggested by the
examples above, is that crowdsourcing provides access to a large pool
of contingent workers who can be gainfully employed in reviewing the
information that seems to overwhelm Fee Controllers.
Fee application review would seem to be a nearly ideal project for
a crowdsourced solution. The new Fee Guidelines already require
estate-paid professionals in mega-bankruptcy cases to keep
contemporaneous time entries “in time periods of tenths of an hour,”
that services “be noted in detail and not combined or ‘lumped’
together, with each service showing a separate time entry,” and that
time entries “give sufficient detail” to identify the nature of the service
provided.261 In short, professional fee applications are already divided
into the type of discrete chunks of information that separate
individuals could review asynchronously and on which those
individuals can provide feedback. And because no special expertise is
required, the pool of people who could potentially serve as adjunct fee
controllers is enormous.262
A crowdsourced fee control system should devolve the initial
review of professional fee applications to the crowd. The crowd could
initially review the time and expense entries in fee applications to look
for patterns, double-check the fees and expenses against any relevant
local rules or guidelines, and cross-check time entries across billers and
across professionals. The value of crowdsourcing is particularly
evident when considering the type of cross-referencing that must be
part of a detailed fee review. One point of cross-referencing
professional fee applications is to verify the accuracy of the requested
compensation. For example, when multiple professionals attend the
same meeting, cross-referencing their fee applications helps to ensure
that no professional is requesting compensation for more time than
others at the same meeting. The crowd should be able to identify every
professional billing time for attending the same meeting and then flag
for Fee Controllers if one or more professionals billedperhaps
260

Cf. In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 562, 601 n.1 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker,
J., concurring).
261
Fee Guidelines, supra note 19; see, e.g., Rapoport, Value Billing, supra note 21, at
126 (quoting the U.S. Trustee Guidelines, 28 C.F.R. § 58, app. A(a) (2010)).
262
Eggers & Hamill, supra note 240; see also Franklin et al., supra note 242.
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inadvertentlymore time than the rest of the professionals at that
meeting. In that case, Fee Controllers (rather than the crowd) can
follow up with the relevant professional.263 Where, like this example, a
task can be clearly defined and the crowd can be appropriately
incentivized, much of the tedious work of reviewing fee applications
could be effectively crowdsourced. Moreover, these adjunct fee
controllers might be able to bring innovative solutions to bear from
other fields to, among other things, mine this data more effectively
then currently occurs.
A crowdsourced fee control system can be expected to produce
even more information than the current system does. A critical feature
of any crowdsourced fee control system must include a method of
sorting the useful information from the useless information.264 A
variety of solutions to this sorting problem appear to be available.
Borrowing from a method already used by fee examiners, one solution
is to focus first on big-ticket items.265 Information produced by the
crowd could be input, by the crowd, into a sortable database. This
could allow Fee Controllers to focus on information related to the
most egregious instances of potential professional overcharging first.
Another solution is to utilize the crowd to “bubble up”
information.266 Once members of the crowd have identified instances
of potential overbilling by professionals, those instances could be
resubmitted to the crowd, which can itself provide a quality-control
function by confirming that the highlighted entries do, in fact,

263

If the crowd finds potential issues, it could bring these issues to the attention of
Fee Controllers, much as Congress assumed that creditors would do in corporate
bankruptcy cases. See supra note 8.
264
Crowdsourcing may be even more useful in vetting information produced by
others than producing the original information itself. See also Michael S. Bernstein et
al., Soylent: A Word Processor with a Crowd Inside, PROC. 23RD ANN. ACM SYMP. ON USER
INTERFACE SOFTWARE & TECH, 2010, at 313, http://courses.cse.tamu.edu/caverlee/
csce438/readings/soylent.pdf.
265
See Lupica & Rapoport, supra note 6 (noting the tendency of fee examiners to
review only big-ticket work items).
266
At least one study has found that requiring at least five members of the crowd
to identify the same issue can help to achieve expert-quality results. See Chris CallisonBurch, Fast, Cheap, and Creative: Evaluating Translation Quality Using Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk, PROC. 2009 CONF. ON EMPIRICAL METHODS IN NAT. LANGUAGE
PROCESSING, 2009, at 286, 293, https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/D/D09/D091030.pdf. In essence, crowdsourcing allows brute force solutions to problems. See
Jeffrey M. Rzeszotarski & Aniket Kittur, Instrumenting the Crowd: Using Implicit Behavioral
Measures to Predict Task Performance, PROC. 24TH ANN. ACM SYMP. ON USER INTERFACE
SOFTWARE & TECH, 2011, at 13, http://jeffrz.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/
fp359-rzeszotarski.pdf (discussing the value of multiple redundant worker judgments
as a quality-control mechanism).
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concern instances of overcharging.267 By employing a two-step
crowdsourced process (information-production and informationverification), some studies have found that, under certain conditions,
a crowd of novices can produce near-expert results.268
Still another solution would be to task fee examiners or the
United States Trustees’ office with evaluating the responses of the
crowd instead of doing the initial work of identifying instances of
potential overbilling.269 Given the rates charged by fee examiners,
redeploying them in an information-verification role instead of an
information-production role could produce substantial cost savings
without any decrease in the quality of fee control. Finally, the
bankruptcy court would remain the ultimate arbiter of whether a
particular fee or expense was appropriate or not. Crowdsourcing can
merely help highlight the most potentially problematic bills so that the
court can review them.
iii. Innovation
Crowdsourcing also promises to help fix chapter 11’s flawed fee
control system by unleashing innovation.
In other contexts,
crowdsourcing has resulted in creative solutions to problems that
previously stumped experts in those fields. For example, Netflix
created a prize to improve the company’s algorithm for movie
recommendations after the company’s own engineers likely ran out of
ideas.270 Similarly, crowdsourcing generated innovative solutions for
locating rich veins of gold for Goldcorp to mine after the company’s
in-house geological team proved unsuccessful.271 Crowdsourcing also
allowed P&G to recapture its place as a top consumer products
company by allowing the company to find innovative partners who

267

See Aniket Kittur et al., Crowdsourcing User Studies with Mechanical Turk, PROC.
SIGCHI CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS COMPUTING SYS., 2008, at 453, 455, http://wwwusers.cs.umn.edu/~echi/papers/2008-CHI2008/2008-02-mech-turk-onlineexperiments-chi1049-kittur.pdf (finding that when there are “explicitly verifiable
questions as part of the task,” the crowd is able to provide work that is near expert
quality, despite the crowd representing “a more novice perspective”).
268
See id.; see also Bernstein et al., supra note 264, at 314 (employing a Find-FixVerify system to split tasks “into a series of generation and review stages that utilize
independent agreement and voting to produce reliable results”).
269
Goldcorp appears to have utilized a panel of expert judges to evaluate
submissions in the Goldcorp Challenge. Press Release, Goldcorp., Inc., Exploration
at Web Speed Semi-Finalists Earn 1st US$250,000 in the World’s First INTERNET
GOLDRUSH (Oct. 26, 2000), http://www.infomine.com/index/pr/Pa055952.PDF.
Fee control could follow suit.
270
NETFLIX PRIZE, http://www.netflixprize.com/ (last visited Nov. 25, 2015).
271
See supra Part II.A.
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reignited the firm’s R&D department.272
Chapter 11’s fee control system could benefit from crowdsourced
innovations. Some of those innovations might be the development of
entirely new ideas on how to control fees, but other innovations might
relate to how to perform existing fee control tasks more efficiently.
Crowdsourcing might also serve as a mechanism to implement some
of these new ideas.
Commentators have already put forward a host of ideas on how to
improve the fee control process. These ideas include, among others,
creating a series of benchmarks for the cost of common professional
services in chapter 11 cases.273 Professional fees in bankruptcy cases are
a matter of public record and members of the crowd could review the
data in prior bankruptcy cases to create these benchmarks.274 For
example, this type of work might reveal that in the last ten megabankruptcy cases, professionals were paid a median fee of $10,000 to
prepare a joint administration motion.275 If in a new case a professional
firm requests $20,000 to prepare a joint administration motion, Fee
Controllers might justifiably require that firm to explain why an
upward departure from comparable recent cases is warranted.276
Similarly, it might be appropriate to safe-harbor compensation
requests that fall below that historic norm.
Another innovative solution that the crowd might help
implement would be to create a database of bankruptcy professionals
and their experience so that Fee Controllers could more easily make
the required determinations under § 330(a)(3)(E).277 With such
information, professionals lacking substantial bankruptcy experience
might be unable to bill their time at rates comparable to more
seasoned bankruptcy professionals. As matters currently stand, most
law firms disclose only the class year of associates, which is, at best, a
272

See supra Part II.B.
See LOPUCKI & DOHERTY, PROFESSIONAL FEES, supra note 41.
274
Another benefit of these benchmarks might be to convince some bankruptcy
professionals to more confidently switch from an hourly fee model to a value-billing
model, using these benchmarks as a guide.
275
Bankruptcy cases involving multiple related debtors are often administratively
consolidated in order to save money and avoid duplicative effort.
276
As Professor LoPucki has pointed out to Author in private correspondence, in
some instances, the cost of the same motion does and should vary with the size of the
case and other variables. As a result, a regression analysis will be necessary to make
the data comparable. There seems to be no reason why members of the crowd could
not also do this work.
277
11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(3)(E) (2011) requires bankruptcy courts to determine, “with
respect to a professional person, whether the person is board certified or otherwise
has demonstrated skill and experience in the bankruptcy field.”
273
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rough proxy of general experience and provides no insight into an
associate’s bankruptcy experience.278 If a bankruptcy experience
database were created, Fee Controllers could more easily determine
the appropriateness of the rates being charged by bankruptcy
professionals.
Some commentators have argued that bankruptcy is not the place
for innovation to occur.279 There seems, however, to be no reason why
innovative ideas could not spread from bankruptcy to other areas of
the law instead of the other way around. And again, crowdsourcing
may merely compliment existing forms of information-gathering and
information-processing already available to and employed by Fee
Controllers. By enhancing chapter 11’s top-down system with
crowdsourced features, chapter 11 could be improved in some of the
ways described in this Article.
B. What Might Crowdsourcing Look Like in Chapter 11?
Designing an optimal crowdsourcing solution for chapter 11’s
problems is likely to be complicated and may require an iterative
process. A well-designed system will need to determine, among other
things: (i) who belongs in the crowd;280 (ii) how to notify the crowd that
a potential problem is available to be solved; (iii) how to incentivize
the crowd to participate;281 (iv) who owns the solutions offered by the
278

See Lubben, The Microeconomics of Chapter 11, supra note 3, at 88.
Id. at 91 (arguing that if “the direct costs of chapter 11 are in line with other
large corporate transactions . . . general improvements in the market for professional
services, rather than any bankruptcy-specific innovation” is the appropriate way to
reduce chapter 11 costs).
280
The appropriate crowd is likely to vary with the type of problem being solved.
Although some tasks may benefit from being offered to the largest possible crowd of
potential problem-solvers, other tasks might be more effectively solved by limiting the
size of the crowd. On the one hand, even when a problem is opened to everyone in
the world, the crowd of solvers may be “surprisingly small” at times. Franklin et al.,
supra note 242. On the other hand, it is important to try to prevent over-participation
by self-interested parties. Fennell, supra note 11, at 404. In addition, too many
potential solutions can be worse than too few when all of the solutions need to be
filtered through a limited group of people before they can be implemented. See
Vermeule, supra note 180, at 2 (expressing concern about creating a potential chokepoint).
Appropriately defining who should be in the crowd may require some
experimentation. While a larger crowd ought to produce better results, it will only do
so if Fee Controllers can effectively sort through the unhelpful “assistance” to find the
new, useful information provided by the crowd. Different crowdsourcing systems have
employed different methods, and it remains to be seen what will be most effective in
chapter 11 cases.
281
Cf. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Noise Reduction: The Screen Value of Qui
Tam, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1169 (2014) (discussing how to construct appropriate
279
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crowd;282 (v) whether larger tasks must be divisible into smaller
pieces;283 (vi) whether members of the crowd must be able to build on
each other’s work;284 and (vii) whether crowdsourcing must be an
online process.285 Another critical inquiry relates to quality control:
how to sort high-quality information from low-quality information.286
The next three sections of this Article offer some preliminary thoughts
on three of the most challenging of these questions, but the precise
parameters of a crowdsourced fee control system’s design is beyond
the Article’s scope. These issues will be explored in a planned followup.
i. Who Is in the Crowd?
As originally conceived by Jeff Howe, crowdsourcing involved
inviting a crowd to solve a particular problem by issuing an open
invitation on the Internet and allowing respondents to self-select
incentives to encourage parties to disclose high-quality information of potential
overcharging but not low-quality information).
282
Some scholarship has distinguished open-source and crowdsourced solutions
based on who retains ownership of the work product. In the former case, the
information is typically owned by no one or remains in the public domain. In the
latter case, information typically becomes the property of the requesting party. See,
e.g., Brabham, Crowdsourcing as a Model, supra note 178; Orozco, supra note 163
(suggesting that, in a crowdsourcing model, the “lion’s share of value” is captured by
the crowdsourcing company).
283
Ichatha, supra note 242, at 1112 (divisible projects allow people to work in
parallel with each other and also allows those with only a few spare hours to devote to
contribute meaningfully to a project where everyone else is similarly a part-time
contributor); Stephenson, supra note 12, at 1468 (discussing divisibility in the context
of information substitutes and compliments). See also Fennell, supra note 11, at 405
n.82 (noting that, for some projects, the “modularity” of tasks—the ability to break
down the project into chunks—is the greatest challenge for the requesting party)
(citations omitted); Franklin et al., supra note 242 (dividing a project into microtasks—
those taking not more than one minute in the usual cases—allows the participation of
people who have no special training and does not require a lot of their time); Wolfson
& Lease, supra note 241.
284
See, e.g., Ichatha, supra note 242, at 12 (Crowdsourcing’s power comes from the
ability to engage in a “collaborative community initiative.”).
285
See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 11, at 390 (claiming that new technologies, such as
the Internet, can lower the cost of acquiring information, which would shift the
efficient level of information obtained upward); Mergel et al., supra note 10, at 2074
(noting that the Internet has “further enhanced” crowdsourcing).
286
A lot of the crowdsourcing literature has also addressed this question. See, e.g.,
Howe, supra note 177 (The larger and more diverse the group, the larger number of
solutions you may receive that are almost all “complete crap.”); see also Fennell, supra
note 11, at 394; Franklin et al., supra note 242 (looking at mTurk’s reputation scores);
Schmitt-Sands & Smith, supra note 228 (suggesting reputation scores, but also
adequate cash incentives, screening for intrinsically motivated people, building the
Requestor’s reputation with the work force, and verifying the crowd’s findings directly
as a quality-control mechanism); Vermeule, supra note 180.
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whether they would like to help determine a solution.287 Subsequently,
however, crowdsourcing experimenters have concluded that
unconstrained crowds are not universally good. For one, without
constraints, it is difficult to prevent self-interested parties from overparticipating.288 Instead, Professor Lee Anne Fennell has argued that
the goal should be to “engage participation that is appropriately scaled
and representative,” which will typically not mean maximizing
participation.289 In addition to concerns about self-interested behavior,
more information tends to be received with larger crowds, resulting in
information of a lower average quality.290
Some experimentation is likely warranted. Even with an open
call, in some cases few people are interested in participating in
crowdsourcing exercises. Perhaps fee control issues will prove to be a
set of problems that few people are interested in helping to solve.291 In
that case, it may be that inviting anyone who is interested would be the
appropriate solution.292 Alternatively, it may suggest the importance of
targeting potential problem solvers and then working to incentivize
their participation.293 In addition, some crowdsourcing scholars, such
as Professor Daren Brabham, have suggested that limiting
participation is often more useful than realized.294
Whether a crowdsourced fee control system should use an open
call or not will depend heavily on how many people are interested in
participating, whether interested parties engage in self-interested
behavior that distorts the process, and how effectively the system can
process all of the information that is received. It does seem, however,
that if these problems can be adequately addressed, an open call would
be appropriate. As discussed above, Fee Controllers would benefit
from the information provided by bankruptcy experts and non-experts
alike, whether or not those people are involved in a particular
bankruptcy case.

287

Howe, supra note 177.
Fennell, supra note 11, at 404.
289
Id. at 408.
290
Stephenson, supra note 12.
291
See Franklin et al., supra note 242.
292
Ichatha, supra note 242, at 14 (arguing that “at least one potential problemsolver in the group needs to be good enough to solve the problem or one of its
modules”).
293
Schmitt-Sands & Smith, supra note 228 (discussing the ability to screen workers
based on their reputation).
294
Brabham, Crowdsourcing the Public Participation Process, supra note 12 (noting that
many articles caution against the optimistic view of public participation).
288
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ii. Incentivizing the Crowd
A crowdsourced fee control system will need to develop
appropriate incentives for encouraging the crowd’s participation. The
current system does not provide appropriate incentives, which is why
many parties-in-interest to bankruptcy cases do not already participate
in fee control. If a crowdsourced fee control system is to encourage
better participation, it is important to consider how to limit the costs
of participating and/or how to increase the available rewards (for
those who can currently participate) or create appropriate rewards
(for those who cannot).
The existing crowdsourcing literature has identified an array of
possible incentives for encouraging participation that may be relevant
to a crowdsourced fee control system, including: (i) money;295 (ii)
altruism;296 (iii) reputation;297 (iv) demonstrating competence,
particularly in a new field;298 (v) creating a sense of belonging or group
membership;299 (vi) entertainment;300 and (vii) intellectual
fulfillment.301 Importantly, the appropriate incentive for different
members of the crowd will likely differ. For some, no incentive—
certainly no monetary incentive—is required. Instead, providing the
answer is its own reward.302 This type of incentive is evident in many
areas of the Internet, where users volunteer enormous amounts of
sometimes very personal information about their lives and
experiences.303 Even where monetary rewards are used to incentivize
participation in crowdsourcing projects, crowdsourced labor has
frequently proven to be cheaper than using traditional employees.304
This seems particularly likely to be true in the legal arena, where the
hourly rate of some restructuring professionals is substantially higher
than the rates paid to Turkers.
In addition, it is not clear that the question of what sort of
incentive to offer can be disaggregated from the question of who
295

Ichatha, supra note 242; Orozco, supra note 163, at 6.
Ichatha, supra note 242; see also Fennell, supra note 11, at 405; Orozco, supra note
163, at 7.
297
Ichatha, supra note 242.
298
Id.
299
Id.; see also Brabham, Crowdsourcing as a Model, supra note 178, at 82 (social
capital); Orozco, supra note 163, at 7.
300
Orozco, supra note 163, at 7 (Crowdworkers often describe contributions as “a
fruitful way to spend extra time.”).
301
Brabham, Crowdsourcing as a Model, supra note 178, at 82.
302
Fennell, supra note 11, at 405.
303
Id. at 392–93.
304
Howe, supra note 177.
296
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should be in the crowd. If people are generally disinterested in
participating, larger incentives will probably be required. But if
interest is robust, smaller incentives ought to be sufficient. In addition,
if fee control activities are competing for the attention of Turkers, the
incentives can likely be small since HITs tend to pay poorly. By
contrast, if fee control activities are competing for the attention of busy
lawyers, accountants, and investment bankers, the incentives will likely
need to be larger because these professions tend to pay fairly well.305
Finally, it may also be that a larger incentive is needed at first to
overcome initial inertia, but once people get used to participating in
fee control activities, the incentives can be altered.306
iii. Quality Control Issues
Quality control has been an issue with crowdsourcing
experiments. One television executive who successfully crowdsourced
a new program, described most of the non-winning responses as
“complete crap.”307 But even this executive found gold among the
dreck. Others too have found that quality control is a surmountable
challenge.308 One possible solution is to limit who may participate in a
crowdsourced fee control system in an attempt to generate higherquality information, at least for certain tasks.309 Other successfully
employed solutions involved creating a reputation score for members
of the crowd,310 spot-checking the results of the crowd,311 and
empowering a small group of decision-makers to judge the suggestions

305

It may also be the case, however, that anonymity would be sufficient. It may be
that the reason why professionals who are troubled by excessive or inappropriate
requests for compensation do not speak up is because they fear retribution.
Alternatively, certain lawyers or law firms might attempt to make their reputation as
the “honest” lawyers and could bolster that reputation by publicly attacking the
unreasonable fee and expense requests of other professionals.
306
Fennell, supra note 11, at 405.
307
Howe, supra note 177 (describing the response of “Michael Hirschorn,
executive vice president of original programming and production at VH1 and a
creator of the cable channel’s hit show Web Junk 20”).
308
See Schmitt-Sands & Smith, supra note 228; see also Julie S. Downs et al., supra
note 228.
309
Schmitt-Sands & Smith, supra note 228 (noting the benefits of identifying
intrinsically motivated participants).
310
See id. (discussing the ability to screen workers based on their reputation); see
also Fennell, supra note 11, at 394; Michael J. Franklin et al., supra note 242 (looking
at reputation scores in mTurk).
311
Schmitt-Sands & Smith, supra note 228; see also Krmpot Vera, The Fight Against
Corruption-Crowdsourcing, 3 INT’L J. ECON. & L. 61, 61 (2013) (suggesting that a
“relatively small number of people can be [sic] coordinate the activities of a large
number of those who contribute”).
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offered by the crowd.312
Once again, time will tell what works best for a crowdsourced fee
control system, including issues pertaining to quality control. If the
volume of information received is minimal, perhaps the United States
Trustee will be best situated to vet the information received and to
object where the United State Trustees’ office deems appropriate.
Alternatively, the crowd—through employing a multi-step process of
generating ideas, refining the original suggestions, and verifying the
data’s accuracy—may be able to ensure the information passed along
to judges is of high quality.313
CONCLUSION
As this Article defines crowdsourcing, the process of solving
problems by drawing on the contributions of many people, it has been
around for as long as humans have worked together to solve
problems.314 The concept has been employed by both non-profit
organizations and commercial enterprises for decades, and with great
success.315 This Article offers some preliminary thoughts on how
crowdsourcing can be usefully employed in the commercial
bankruptcy system.
Crowdsourcing is useful for performing the sort of tasks that
plague chapter 11’s current fee control system. As described above,
crowdsourcing is a process of obtaining needed services, information,
ideas, or content by soliciting contributions from a large group of
people. It is also a particularly useful strategy for subdividing tedious
work, and it is most effective when each participant can perform a
discrete portion of the work that must be done. These are exactly the
problems chapter 11’s fee control system needs to solve. Chapter 11
would benefit if Fee Controllers had additional information about
potential overcharging in fee applications, and if they could outsource
some of the tedious, detail-oriented work required by a typical fee
review. Individually, each member of the crowd could make small but
significant contributions to chapter 11’s fee control process.
Collectively, the crowd can make important and potentially gamechanging contributions. Chapter 11’s fee control system should be reexamined to determine where crowdsourcing can make the most
312

See Vermeule, supra note 180, at 1.
See supra note 268.
314
See, e.g., supra note 10.
315
The Audobon Society crowdsources its yearly North American bird count. See
AUDOBON.ORG, supra note 10; cf. Ichatha, supra note 242, at 1011 (discussing how the
British Government crowdsourced a solution to the “Longitude Problem”).
313
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significant impact.
Crowdsourcing holds great promise for fixing chapter 11’s flawed
fee control system. In other contexts, crowdsourcing has resulted in
creative solutions to problems that previously stumped experts in those
fields. Crowdsourcing has allowed the National Audubon Society to
attempt to count every bird in the Western Hemisphere every year
since at least 1900.316 Pillsbury, considered one of the earliest
progenitors of crowdsourcing, has been relying on the wisdom of
crowds to produce better baked goods via its “Pillsbury Bake-off” mailin cooking competition since 1949.317 Based on these examples and
the other examples offered throughout this Article, there is reason to
believe that crowdsourcing would result in creative solutions being
developed to fix flaws in chapter 11’s fee control system.
This Article has sought explain why crowdsourcing might be
useful in the fee control context; however, all of the particulars have
not been worked out yet and much work remains to be done. Yet this
is hopefully the first step in building a better bankruptcy system for the
years to come.

316

Edgar B. Herwick III, The Christmas Bird Count: The Original Crowdsource, WGBH
(Dec. 18, 2014, 10:57 AM), http://wgbhnews.org/post/christmas-bird-count-originalcrowdsource (describing how approximately 70,000 citizen-scientists collect data each
year on bird counts).
317
Tina Rosenberg, Crowdsourcing a Better World, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2011, 9:15
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/28/crowdsourcing-abetter-world/?_r=0.

